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Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey 
Ruling Below: Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2014) 
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking declaratory relief and permanent injunctions against the 
enforcement of two recent amendments to Texas's laws pertaining to the performing of 
abortions. On August 29, 2014, the last business day before the ambulatory surgical center 
provision would go into effect, the district court delivered its opinion and issued a final judgment 
enjoining the admitting privileges requirement and ambulatory surgical center provision of H.B. 
2 as to all abortion facilities in Texas. The district court also enjoined other specific applications 
of H.B. 2. The district court opined that together these requirements "create a brutally effective 
system of abortion regulation" that is unconstitutional. Appellants (collectively "the State") 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit and filed an emergency motion to stay the district court's injunctions 
pending the resolution of their appeal.  
Question Presented: Whether Texas law places an undue burden before a woman seeking a 
legal abortion. 
 
WHOLE WOMEN’S HEALTH et al., 
Plaintiffs - Appellees 
v. 
David LAKEY, M.D., Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services, in 
his Official Capacity, et al., 
Defendant – Appellants 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
Filed on October 2, 2014 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit 
Judge: 
I. 
On July 12, 2013, the Texas Legislature 
passed H.B. 2. The proposed legislation for 
what became H.B. 2 was first filed in the 
Texas House of Representatives in June 
2013. The House considered the bill in two 
public hearings. After three readings of the 
bill before the entire House, H.B. 2 passed 
with a 96-49 vote. The bill was then sent to 
the Texas Senate, which also held a public 
hearing and read the bill three times. The 
Senate engaged in a debate in which a 
number of senators gave speeches for and 
against the bill, and ultimately passed H.B. 2 
with a final vote of 19-11. 
Two of H.B. 2's provisions are at issue here. 
The first requires any physician performing 
an abortion to have active admitting 
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of 
the location where the abortion is performed. 
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The admitting privileges requirement went 
into effect on October 31, 2013. The second 
provision requires that all abortion clinics 
existing on or after September 1, 2014, 
comply with the same minimum standards 
required of ambulatory surgical centers. The 
regulatory standards for ambulatory surgical 
centers contain two main categories: (1) 
physical plant, which includes architectural, 
electrical, plumbing, and HVAC 
requirements, and (2) operations, which 
includes requirements for medical records 
systems, training, staffing, and cleanliness.  
We are familiar with legal challenges to H.B. 
2. In 2013, the district court enjoined 
enforcement of H.B. 2's admitting privileges 
requirement and medication abortion 
provision, and the State challenged the 
injunction on appeal. In that case, we granted 
in part the State's emergency motion to stay 
the permanent injunction, and later upheld 
both the admitting privileges requirement and 
the medication abortion provision as facially 
constitutional.  
In the instant lawsuit, Plaintiffs challenge the 
admitting privileges requirement, this time 
not on its face, but as applied to two specific 
clinics. Whole Woman's Health and Dr. 
Sherwood C. Lynn, Jr. challenge the 
requirement as applied to the clinic operated 
by Whole Woman's Health in McAllen. Nova 
Health Systems and Dr. Pamela J. Richter 
challenge the requirement as applied to the 
clinic operated by Reproductive Services in 
El Paso. Plaintiffs also challenge the 
ambulatory surgical center provision as 
unconstitutional on its face, and as applied to 
the clinics in McAllen and El Paso, and as 
applied to medication abortion. 
The district court's judgment extended 
beyond Plaintiffs' claims and the relief 
requested. Not only did the district court 
enjoin the admitting privileges requirement 
as applied to the McAllen and El Paso clinics, 
as Plaintiffs sought, the district court 
determined that the admitting privileges 
requirement "create[d] an impermissible 
obstacle as applied to all women seeking a 
previability abortion."  
As to the ambulatory surgical center 
provision, the district court's opinion and 
final judgment are unclear. The final 
judgment declares that the ambulatory 
surgical center provision is unconstitutional 
"as to all abortion facilities in the State" with 
two exceptions: (1) facilities already licensed 
and meeting the minimum standards; and (2) 
all future abortion facilities commencing 
operation after the effective date. 
Confusingly, the judgment further declares 
that the ambulatory surgical center provision 
is unconstitutional and that when considered 
together with the admitting privileges 
requirement, "create[s] an impermissible 
obstacle as applied to all women seeking a 
previability abortion." In their briefs and at 
oral argument, the parties expressed 
uncertainty as to whether the district court 
intended to invalidate this provision on its 
face or, according to the earlier language, as 
applied to some clinics in the state. 
It is also unclear whether the district court 
specifically determined that the provision is 
unconstitutional as applied to the McAllen 
and El Paso clinics. While Plaintiffs made 
these as-applied challenges, the district court 
did not directly address them in either the 
declarations section of its final judgment or 
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the conclusion of its opinion. However, the 
district court indicated in the introductory 
parts of its opinion and judgment that it 
intended to do so. We note that the broad 
judgment "as applied to all women" logically 
would include the McAllen and El Paso 
clinics, even though the district court did not 
specifically address in its conclusions and 
judgment Plaintiffs' as-applied claims for 
these locations. 
To alleviate confusion and to fairly address 
the State's emergency motion and Plaintiffs' 
response, we consider whether to stay 
injunctions of both the admitting privileges 
requirement and the ambulatory surgical 
center provision on their face—or in the 
district court's words, "as applied to all 
women in Texas"—and as applied to the 
McAllen and El Paso clinics. In addition, we 
will address the injunction of the ambulatory 
surgical center provision as applied to 
medication abortions.  
II. 
"Factual findings by the district court are 
typically reviewed for clear error." The 
district court found, after trial with witness 
credibility determinations, that Texas had 
over forty abortion clinics prior to the 
enactment of H.B. 2, and that after the 
ambulatory surgical center provision takes 
effect, only seven or eight clinics will remain, 
representing more than an 80% reduction in 
clinics statewide in nearly fourteen months, 
with a 100% reduction in clinics west and 
south of San Antonio. The district court 
further found that there was no credible 
evidence of medical or health benefit 
associated with the ambulatory surgical 
center provision in the abortion context. 
The district court also found: (1) the 
construction costs of bringing existing clinics 
into compliance with the minimum standards 
for ambulatory surgical centers "will 
undisputedly approach 1 million dollars and 
will most likely exceed 1.5 million dollars"; 
(2) "the cost of acquiring land and 
constructing a new compliant clinic will 
likely exceed three million dollars" for 
existing clinics that cannot comply due to 
physical space limitations; (3) the 
enforcement of both challenged H.B. 2 
provisions will increase women's travel 
distances to clinics; for example, 1.3 million 
women of reproductive age in Texas will live 
more than 100 miles from a clinic, 900,000 
women will live more than 150 miles from a 
clinic, 750,000 women will live more than 
200 miles from a clinic, and some women 
will live as far as 500 miles from a clinic; (4) 
the burdens of increased travel combine with 
"practical concerns includ[ing] lack of 
availability of child care, unreliability of 
transportation, unavailability of 
appointments at abortion facilities, 
unavailability of time off from work, 
immigration status and inability to pass 
border checkpoints, poverty level, [and] the 
time and expense involved in traveling long 
distances"; and (5) the remaining seven or 
eight clinics likely will not have the capacity 
to perform 60,000-72,000 abortions per year 
in Texas. 
III. 
We consider four factors in deciding whether 
to grant a stay pending appeal:  
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(1) whether the stay applicant has 
made a strong showing that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) 
whether the applicant will be 
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) 
whether issuance of the stay will 
substantially injure the other parties 
interested in the proceeding; and (4) 
where the public interest lies. 
A stay "is not a matter of right, even if 
irreparable injury might otherwise result to 
the appellant."  
The State initially filed a motion to stay in 
this court and, shortly thereafter, filed the 
same motion with the district court. The 
district court denied the motion "for 
substantially the reasons stated in its 
memorandum opinion." Plaintiffs do not 
object to the order in which the State filed its 
motions and agree that the present motion is 
properly before us. 
IV. 
"Before viability, a State may not prohibit 
any woman from making the ultimate 
decision to terminate her pregnancy." Nor 
may a State "impose upon this right an undue 
burden, which exists if a regulation's purpose 
or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
before the fetus attains viability." To 
determine the constitutionality of a state law, 
we ask "whether the Act, measured by its text 
in this facial attack, imposes a substantial 
obstacle to . . . previability[] abortions."  
Following Carhart and Casey, our circuit 
conducts a two-step approach, first applying 
a rational basis test, then independently 
determining if the burden on a woman's 
choice is undue.  
A. 
Though Plaintiffs sought only as-applied 
relief from the admitting privileges 
requirement, limited to two abortion 
clinics—one in El Paso and one in 
McAllen—the district court, in its final 
judgment, appears to have facially 
invalidated the admitting privileges 
requirement throughout Texas. This was 
inappropriate because Plaintiffs did not 
request that relief. Furthermore, the district 
court's facial invalidation of the admitting 
privileges requirement is directly contrary to 
this circuit's precedent. Abbott II specifically 
upheld the facial constitutionality of the 
admitting privileges requirement. 
B. 
We now turn to the central question presented 
by this emergency motion: whether the State 
has shown a likelihood of success regarding 
whether the ambulatory surgical center 
provision is unconstitutional on its face. We 
conclude that it has. 
As explained in Abbott II, if the State 
establishes that a law is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest, we do not second 
guess the legislature regarding the law's 
wisdom or effectiveness. Nor is the State 
"required to prove that the objective of the 
law would be fulfilled."  
The district court concluded that H.B. 2, 
including both provisions at issue here, 
"surmount[ed] the low bar of rational-basis 
review." We agree with the district court's 
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conclusion that the ambulatory surgical 
center provision satisfies rational basis 
review. In addition, no party challenges the 
district court's conclusion. 
Thus, our review will focus on the second 
step of this circuit's approach; namely, 
whether this provision imposes an undue 
burden. The undue burden inquiry looks to 
whether the challenged provision has either 
"the purpose or effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus."  
1. 
We begin with the purpose inquiry. 
"[P]laintiffs bore the burden of attacking the 
State's purpose here," and the State has 
shown a strong likelihood that Plaintiffs 
failed to meet that burden. 
The district court determined that "the 
ambulatory-surgical-center requirement was 
intended to close existing licensed abortion 
clinics." To support its conclusion, the 
district court determined that H.B. 2 treats 
abortion facilities in a "disparate and 
arbitrary" manner by not including an 
exception to the ambulatory surgical center 
provision for previously licensed abortion 
providers. According to the district court, 
"other types of ambulatory-surgical facilities 
are frequently granted waivers or are 
grandfathered due to construction dates that 
predate the newer construction 
requirements." 
The State argues that the district court 
misunderstood the relevant provision in the 
governing Texas regulation. As the State 
reads the provision, H.B. 2 does not treat 
abortion facilities disparately from other 
ambulatory surgical centers in this respect. 
According to the State, there is no 
ambulatory surgical center exemption for any 
facility within the statutorily-defined subset 
requiring licensure, regardless of whether it 
provides abortions. The provision cited by 
the district court provides an exemption to 
any facility previously licensed as an 
ambulatory surgical center that failed to 
comply with new building code requirements 
amended in June 2009. Any such facility, 
regardless of whether it provides abortions, 
qualifies for the exemption. Based on our 
review of the relevant provision, we agree 
with the State that ambulatory surgical 
centers providing abortions are not treated 
differently from other ambulatory surgical 
centers. 
Besides its view of the above regulation, the 
district court cited no record evidence to 
support its determination that the ambulatory 
surgical center provision was enacted for the 
purpose of imposing an undue burden on 
women seeking abortions, nor did it make 
any factual finding regarding an improper 
purpose. The Texas Legislature's stated 
purpose was to improve patient safety. As we 
observed in Abbott I, the State of Texas has 
an "interest in protecting the health of women 
who undergo abortion procedures." Courts 
are not permitted to second guess a 
legislature's stated purposes absent clear and 
compelling evidence to the contrary. Such 
evidence simply does not appear in the record 
here. 
Alternatively, the district court opined that it 
was "not required" to find actual evidence of 
improper purpose because H.B. 2's 
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ambulatory surgical center provision has the 
effect of creating an undue burden. To the 
extent the district court found an improper 
purpose based on the law's effect, the State is 
likely to succeed on the merits. 
2. 
We now evaluate whether the State has 
shown a likelihood of success on the merits 
of whether the ambulatory surgical center 
provision "has the effect of imposing an 
unconstitutional burden" sufficient to justify 
a facial invalidation. The State has made such 
a showing. 
Facial challenges relying on the effects of a 
law "impose[] a heavy burden upon the 
part[y] maintaining the suit." In Carhart, the 
Supreme Court recognized the existence of 
divergent views as to "[w]hat that burden 
consists of in the specific context of abortion 
statutes . . . ." It is well-settled in this circuit 
that "[a] facial challenge will succeed only 
where the plaintiff shows that there is no set 
of circumstances under which the statute 
would be constitutional." The Supreme Court 
uses the same "no set of circumstances" rule 
in general for facial challenges. However, as 
we noted in Abbott II, it is not clear whether 
the Supreme Court applies this general rule in 
abortion cases. 
In Casey, the controlling plurality held that 
an abortion-regulating statute would fail 
constitutional muster if, "in a large fraction of 
the cases in which it is relevant, it will operate 
as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice 
to undergo an abortion." In earlier abortion 
cases, the Court used the "no set of 
circumstances" approach. The more recent 
Carhart majority did not choose between "no 
set of circumstances" and "large fraction," 
but instead upheld the statute in question on 
the basis that the facial challenge could not 
satisfy either standard. We will do the same 
here, as we did in Abbott I and Abbott II, and 
"apply the 'large fraction' nomenclature for 
the sake of argument only, without casting 
doubt on the general rule."  
The ambulatory surgical center provision 
applies to all clinics performing abortions. 
Every woman in Texas who seeks an abortion 
will be affected to some degree by this 
requirement because it effectively narrows 
her options for where to obtain an abortion. 
As the parties stipulated at trial, six licensed 
ambulatory surgical centers "will not be 
prevented by the ambulatory surgical center 
[provision] of HB 2 from performing 
abortions." These are located in Austin, 
Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, and San 
Antonio. The parties also stipulated that 
Planned Parenthood has obtained a license to 
open a new ambulatory surgical center in 
Dallas, and announced its intention to open 
another one in San Antonio. However, the 
parties further stipulated that all other 
abortion facilities now licensed by the State 
of Texas cannot currently comply with the 
provision. The district court concluded that 
this reduction in supply of clinics was an 
undue burden and facially invalidated the 
ambulatory surgical center provision. In 
doing so, the district court applied neither the 
Fifth Circuit's "no set of circumstances" test 
nor Casey's "large fraction" test. Instead, the 
district court found that "a significant number 
of the reproductive-age female population of 
Texas will need to travel considerably further 
in order to exercise its right to a legal 
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previability abortion." The district court 
"conclude[d] that the practical impact on 
Texas women due to the clinics' closure 
statewide would operate for a significant 
number of women in Texas just as drastically 
as a complete ban on abortion." However, 
under this circuit's precedent, and Carhart, a 
"significant number" is insufficient unless it 
amounts to a "large fraction."  
The district court also erred when it balanced 
the efficacy of the ambulatory surgical center 
provision against the burdens the provision 
imposed. In the district court's view, "the 
severity of the burden imposed by both 
requirements is not balanced by the weight of 
the interests underlying them." As support for 
this proposition, the court evaluated whether 
the ambulatory surgical center provision 
would actually improve women's health and 
safety. This approach contravenes our 
precedent. In our circuit, we do not balance 
the wisdom or effectiveness of a law against 
the burdens the law imposes.  
The district court's weighing of the interests 
basically boils down to the district court's 
own view that the facilities are already safe 
for women and that the ambulatory surgical 
center provision, when implemented, will not 
serve to promote women's health. However, 
Abbott II discusses in detail the perils of 
second-guessing the wisdom of the 
legislature in a constitutional challenge: 
If legislators' predictions about a law 
fail to serve their purpose, the law can 
be changed. Once the courts have 
held a law unconstitutional, however, 
only a constitutional amendment, or 
the wisdom of a majority of justices 
overcoming the strong pull of stare 
decisis, will permit that or similar 
laws to again take effect. 
Moreover, the district court's approach 
ratchets up rational basis review into a 
pseudo-strict-scrutiny approach by 
examining whether the law advances the 
State's asserted purpose. Under our 
precedent, we have no authority by which to 
turn rational basis into strict scrutiny under 
the guise of the undue burden inquiry. 
Plaintiffs argue that the district court's 
balancing approach is used by other circuits. 
We agree with Plaintiffs that some circuits 
have used the balancing test to enjoin 
abortion regulations; other circuits—
including ours—have not. We are bound to 
follow our circuit's approach. 
In addition, Plaintiffs argue that Barnes v. 
Mississippi, supports a balancing approach. 
However, a careful reading of Barnes 
establishes that it does not support Plaintiffs' 
argument. In Barnes, we cited Casey for the 
proposition that "the constitutionality of an 
abortion regulation . . . turns on an 
examination of the importance of the state's 
interests in the regulation and the severity of 
the burden that regulation imposes on a 
woman's right to seek an abortion." We then 
analyzed the importance of the State's interest 
in parental involvement statutes, without 
considering the extent to which the 
challenged law actually advanced that 
interest. Likewise here, the health of women 
seeking abortions is an important purpose. 
Our only remaining task is to analyze the 
severity of the burden the regulation imposes 
on women's right to seek abortions. 
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The district court's failure to apply the "large 
fraction" test, and its reliance on its own 
balancing of the State's justifications against 
the burdens imposed by the law, weigh in 
favor of the State's strong likelihood of 
success on the merits. Moreover, application 
of the "large fraction" test to the evidence 
before us further supports the State's position 
that the evidence at the four-day trial is 
insufficient to show that a "large fraction" of 
women seeking abortions would face an 
undue burden on account of the ambulatory 
surgical center provision. 
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Daniel Grossman, 
opined that the ambulatory surgical center 
provision would increase driving distances 
for women generally, noting that after the 
provision becomes effective, 900,000 out of 
approximately 5.4 million women of 
reproductive age in Texas would live at least 
150 miles from the nearest clinic. He did not 
testify specifically about how many women 
seeking abortions would have to drive more 
than 150 miles or whether that number would 
amount to a large fraction. Assuming that 
women seeking abortions are proportionally 
distributed across the state, Dr. Grossman's 
evidence suggests that approximately one out 
of six (16.7%) women seeking an abortion 
will live more than 150 miles from the nearest 
clinic. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that 150 miles is 
the relevant cut-off, this is nowhere near a 
"large fraction." As discussed above, the 
Casey plurality, in using the "large fraction" 
nomenclature, departed from the general 
standard for facial challenges. The general 
standard for facial challenges allows courts to 
facially invalidate a statute only if "no 
possible application of the challenged law 
would be constitutional." In other words, the 
law must be unconstitutional in 100% of its 
applications. We decline to interpret Casey as 
changing the threshold for facial challenges 
from 100% to 17%. 
Plaintiffs argue that the appropriate 
denominator in the large fraction analysis 
consists only of women "who could have 
accessed abortion services in Texas prior to 
implementation of the challenged 
requirements, but who will face increased 
obstacles as a result of the law." To narrow 
the denominator in this way—to essentially 
only those women who Plaintiffs argue will 
face an undue burden—ignores precedent. 
Casey itself counsels that the denominator 
should encompass all women "for whom the 
law is a restriction." This is also the approach 
that our circuit used in Abbott II. Here, the 
ambulatory surgical center requirement 
applies to every abortion clinic in the State, 
limiting the options for all women in Texas 
who seek an abortion. The appropriate 
denominator thus includes all women 
affected by these limited options. Moreover, 
Plaintiffs' suggested approach would make 
the large fraction test merely a tautology, 
always resulting in a large fraction. The 
denominator would be women that Plaintiffs 
claim are unduly burdened by the statute, and 
the numerator would be the same. 
Based on unspecific testimony at trial, the 
district court also noted "practical concerns" 
that combine with increased travel distances, 
particularly for disadvantaged, minority, and 
immigrant populations. We do not doubt that 
women in poverty face greater difficulties. 
However, to sustain a facial challenge, the 
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Supreme Court and this circuit require 
Plaintiffs to establish that the law itself 
imposes an undue burden on at least a large 
fraction of women. Plaintiffs have not done 
so here. 
The district court also relied on its own 
determination that the ambulatory surgical 
center provision would cause a shortage in 
capacity for the remaining licensed clinics. 
The district court found that 60,000-72,000 
abortions were performed annually in 
previous years. After the ambulatory surgical 
center provision goes into effect, it is 
undisputed that seven or eight clinics will 
remain. Based on Dr. Grossman's testimony, 
the district court then determined that each 
remaining clinic would have to manage, on 
average, 7,500-10,000 patients a year, over 
1,200 patients per month in some cases. Id. 
The district court found that handling this 
high a caseload "stretches credulity." 
However, the district court did not make any 
findings of fact to support its conclusion. Nor 
could it, given that Dr. Grossman's testimony 
is ipse dixit and the record lacks any actual 
evidence regarding the current or future 
capacity of the eight clinics. Dr. Grossman 
simply assumes, without evidence, that these 
centers are currently operating at full 
capacity and will be unable to accommodate 
any increased demand. Likewise, Dr. 
Grossman did not consider how many 
physicians with admitting privileges from 
non-ambulatory surgical centers will begin 
providing abortions at the ambulatory 
surgical center clinics, thereby increasing 
those clinics' capacities. It also does not 
appear from the record that Dr. Grossman 
considered the possibility of additional 
capacity resulting from new clinics' being 
built, nor did he consider that the demand for 
abortion services in Texas may decrease in 
the future, as it has done nationally over the 
past several years. Furthermore, the record 
lacks evidence that the previous closures 
resulting from the admitting privileges 
requirement have caused women to be turned 
away from clinics. Without any evidence on 
these points, Plaintiffs do not appear to have 
met their burden to show that the ambulatory 
surgical center provision will result in 
insufficient clinic capacity that will impose 
an undue burden on a large fraction of 
women. 
The evidence does indicate, without 
specificity, that by requiring all abortion 
clinics to meet the minimum standards of 
ambulatory surgical centers, the overall cost 
of accessing an abortion provider will likely 
increase. However, as the Supreme Court 
recognized in Carhart, and we observed in 
Abbott I, "'[t]he fact that a law which serves a 
valid purpose, one not designed to strike at 
the right itself, has the incidental effect of 
making it more difficult or more expensive to 
procure an abortion cannot be enough to 
invalidate it.'"  
In sum, the State has met its burden as to the 
district court's facial invalidation of the 
admitting privileges requirement and the 
ambulatory surgical center provision.  
V. 
Finally, we address the district court's 
injunctions of both requirements as applied to 
clinics in McAllen and El Paso, as well as the 
ambulatory surgical center provision as 
 407 
applied to medication abortion, and the 
State's likelihood of success on the merits of 
each. We conclude that the State has met its 
burden as to each, with the exception of the 
ambulatory surgical center provision as 
applied to El Paso. 
A. 
The State has shown a strong likelihood of 
success on the merits of its argument that 
Plaintiffs' as-applied challenges to the 
admitting privileges requirement are barred 
by res judicata. In the interests of efficiency 
and finality, the doctrine of res judicata bars 
litigation of claims that have been litigated or 
could have been raised in a prior lawsuit. In 
the lawsuit giving rise to Abbott I and Abbott 
II, Plaintiffs facially challenged the admitting 
privileges requirement. They also could have 
brought, but chose not to bring, as-applied 
challenges with regard to clinics in El Paso 
and McAllen. Their choice not to include the 
as-applied challenges in their previous 
lawsuit likely precludes them from pursuing 
that challenge now. 
To be sure, res judicata bars a subsequent 
lawsuit only if, inter alia, the same "claim or 
cause of action" is involved in both lawsuits. 
To determine whether two lawsuits involve 
the same "claim or cause of action" for 
purposes of res judicata, the Fifth Circuit 
applies the transactional test of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 24. 
Under that test, the "critical issue is whether 
the two actions under consideration are based 
on 'the same nucleus of operative facts.'" If 
the facts on which the second lawsuit is based 
are the same as those prevailing at the time of 
the first lawsuit, the two lawsuits involve the 
same "claim or cause of action" for purposes 
of res judicata. 
Plaintiffs contended, and the district court 
agreed, that the present lawsuit relies on a 
different set of operative facts than did the 
pre-enforcement challenge because the 
abortion clinics in McAllen and El Paso have 
now ceased providing abortion services. 
However, our precedent dictates that changed 
circumstances prevent the application of res 
judicata only if the change is "significant" 
and creates "new legal conditions." The 
closure of the clinics in McAllen and El Paso 
does not create "new legal conditions" 
because, in the pre-enforcement challenge, 
Plaintiffs alleged that the McAllen and El 
Paso clinics would shut down upon 
implementation of H.B. 2. Plaintiffs could 
have relied on these allegations to bring the 
very same as-applied challenge they now 
pursue; they simply chose not to do so. 
The district court stated that "it was not 
known in late October 2013 [i.e., when the 
district court entered its judgment in Abbott] 
that the McAllen and El Paso clinics' 
physicians would ultimately be unable to 
obtain admitting privileges despite efforts to 
secure them." However, the Complaint in 
Abbott, which was filed in September 2013, 
expressly alleged that those clinics would 
close if the admitting privileges requirement 
took effect. Indeed, the physicians who 
performed abortions at those two facilities 
were named plaintiffs in Abbott, further 
undermining any suggestion that the closure 
of the clinics was a significant or unexpected 
change of facts. Thus, Plaintiffs' as-applied 
challenges to the admitting privileges 
requirement are likely barred by res judicata. 
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B. 
Even if Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by res 
judicata, the State is still likely to succeed on 
the merits of whether the admitting privileges 
requirement and the ambulatory surgical 
center provision, as applied to the McAllen 
clinic, have the effect of imposing an undue 
burden on women in the Rio Grande Valley. 
The admitting privileges requirement went 
into effect in October 2013. Since that time, 
abortion clinics have remained open in all of 
the major metropolitan areas across the state. 
The district court found that the number of 
total clinics in Texas decreased from more 
than forty clinics to fewer than thirty clinics 
"leading up to and in the wake of 
enforcement of the admitting-privileges 
requirement." Importantly, Dr. Grossman 
stated in his declaration that he was not 
"offering any opinion on the cause of the 
decline in the number of abortion facilities 
from November 2012 to April 2014." The 
district court further found that no abortion 
providers are in operation in a number of 
cities, including, for example, McAllen, 
Lubbock, Midland, and Waco. The 
ambulatory surgical center provision was set 
to go into effect on September 1, 2014, which 
the district court found would cause even 
more closures, leaving only seven or eight 
licensed providers.  
The district court found that the McAllen 
clinic closed as a result of the admitting 
privileges requirement.. Since that time, the 
women who would have otherwise been 
served by the McAllen clinic had to look 
elsewhere for the procedure. As stated in his 
trial declaration, Dr. Grossman identified 
more than 1,000 women from the Valley who 
sought abortions between November 2013 
and April 2014, and traveled to nearby cities 
where clinics remained open. During that 
period, approximately 50% of those women 
traveled to Corpus Christi, 25% traveled to 
Houston, 15% percent to San Antonio, and 
10% to a location even farther from the 
Valley. 
In Abbott II, relying on Casey, we held that 
having to travel 150 miles from the Rio 
Grande Valley to Corpus Christi is not an 
undue burden. Indeed, Casey permitted even 
greater travel distances, as it upheld a 24-hour 
waiting period that doubled driving times, 
increasing the drive for some women from 
three hours to six hours. 
While the clinic in Corpus Christi remained 
open after the admitting privileges 
requirement went into effect, it currently does 
not comply with the ambulatory surgical 
center provision. The district court found that 
once the provision takes effect, the clinic 
nearest to the Rio Grande Valley will be in 
San Antonio, between 230 and 250 miles 
away. Therefore, we must determine whether 
the State is likely to prevail on its argument 
that this incremental increase of 100 miles in 
distance does not constitute an undue burden. 
At trial, Plaintiffs had the burden of showing 
that the additional travel distance to San 
Antonio constituted an undue burden. As 
noted above, the record indicates that 50% of 
the more than 1,000 women in Dr. 
Grossman's study who resided in the Rio 
Grande Valley and were seeking abortions 
traveled to San Antonio and Houston (which 
is even farther than San Antonio) even when 
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the Corpus Christi clinic was still in 
operation. Plaintiffs also had the burden, 
which they failed to meet, of showing that 
clinics in San Antonio and other nearby cities 
would be unable to manage the additional 
demand for abortions caused by closures. 
Indeed, women from McAllen have been 
traveling outside their city for nearly a year 
and Plaintiffs made no showing that clinics in 
San Antonio (or any other city) have been 
deluged. Considering that Casey upheld 
travel times of six hours (increases of three 
hours) and that women in the Rio Grande 
Valley traveling to San Antonio have less 
total travel time than women affected by the 
Pennsylvania law in Casey, the State has a 
strong likelihood of success on its appeal of 
the injunctions of both requirements as 
applied to the McAllen clinic.  
C. 
As to the El Paso clinic, we grant, in part, and 
deny, in part, the State's motion to stay the 
district court's injunction of the ambulatory 
surgical center provision. The district court 
found that the physical plant requirements of 
the ambulatory surgical center provision 
would force the El Paso clinic to close. As a 
result, women in El Paso will be significantly 
farther from the nearest in-state ambulatory 
surgical center than women in the Rio Grande 
Valley. The distance from El Paso to San 
Antonio, for example, is greater than 500 
miles. The Eighth Circuit has held that no 
travel distance within the state is too far. We 
have not so held. Our circuit has not 
identified whether there is a tipping point 
within the vast State of Texas, but at this early 
stage, we are hesitant to extend Casey to such 
a large distance.  
It is true that approximately half of the 
women from El Paso seeking abortions travel 
to Santa Teresa, New Mexico, which is in the 
same metropolitan area as El Paso and just 
across the state line. Despite the obvious 
practical implications of the New Mexico 
clinic's proximity to El Paso, our circuit's 
precedent suggests that our focus must 
remain on clinics within Texas when 
determining whether travel times create an 
undue burden. Although the situation in 
Texas is markedly different from that in 
Mississippi, the opinion in Jackson contains 
broad language that appears to go beyond the 
facts presented in that case. The panel 
majority saw itself as "require[d] . . . to 
conduct the undue burden inquiry by looking 
only at the ability of Mississippi women to 
exercise their right within Mississippi's 
borders." Given the panel's reliance on 
Gaines, the panel may have meant to apply 
its limitation only to states where all the 
abortion clinics would close. However, we 
are reluctant to construe the panel's broad 
language so narrowly in this emergency stay 
proceeding. Because of the long distance 
between El Paso and the nearest in-state 
abortion clinic, as well as the doubt that 
Jackson casts on whether we may look to out-
of-state clinics, the State has not shown a 
strong likelihood of success on the merits of 
the challenge to the physical plant 
requirements of the ambulatory surgical 
center provision as applied to El Paso. Thus, 
the district court's injunction of the physical 
plant requirements of the ambulatory surgical 
provision will remain in force for El Paso. 
We do, however, stay the injunction as to the 
operational requirements of the ambulatory 
surgical center provision because the district 
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court made no findings about whether the El 
Paso clinic would be able to comply with 
those requirements. The district court's 
conclusion that the ambulatory surgical 
center provision imposed an undue burden 
rested solely on the district court's findings 
regarding the physical plant requirements. In 
view of H.B. 2's severability provision, as 
well as the similar provision in the 
regulations, the district court erred by failing 
to consider whether the physical plant 
requirements could be severed from the 
operational requirements, allowing the 
operational requirements to take effect. As a 
result, it does not appear that the district 
court's injunction of the operational 
requirements was supported by any evidence. 
We therefore stay the district court's 
injunction of the operational requirements. 
D. 
The district court also enjoined the 
ambulatory surgical center provision as 
applied to medication abortions. To the 
extent the district court concluded that the 
ambulatory surgical center provision had an 
improper purpose as applied to medication 
abortion, we have already rejected that 
argument for the reasons stated  above. To 
the extent that the district court determined 
that the provision's effect as applied to 
medication abortion was unconstitutional, the 
record evidence does not support that 
conclusion. In conducting its own balancing 
analysis, the district court stated that "any 
medical justification for the requirement is at 
its absolute weakest in comparison with the 
heavy burden it imposes." However, as 
discussed, our circuit does not incorporate a 
balancing analysis into the undue burden 
inquiry. The district court provided no 
support for its conclusion other than its 
improper balancing. The district court did not 
cite to record evidence or make any findings 
to support its conclusion that the ambulatory 
surgical center provision imposes an undue 
burden as applied to medication abortions. 
Indeed, at oral argument, Plaintiffs could not 
identify any findings in the district court's 
opinion supporting the conclusion that the 
ambulatory surgical center provision 
imposed an undue burden as applied to 
medication abortion. Thus, the State has 
shown a substantial likelihood of success on 
the merits of the district court's injunction of 
the ambulatory surgical center provision as 
applied to medication abortions. 
VI. 
As in Abbott I, the State has made a strong 
showing of likelihood of success on the 
merits of its appeal as to all of the district 
court's injunctions except for the injunction 
of the physical plant requirements of the 
ambulatory surgical center provision as 
applied to the clinic in El Paso. Regarding the 
other three factors we must weigh in 
determining whether to grant a motion to stay 
pending appeal, the State has also met its 
burden. "When a statute is enjoined, the State 
necessarily suffers the irreparable harm of 
denying the public interest in the 
enforcement of its laws. The public interest is 
directly aligned with the State's interest. To 
the extent the State's interest is at stake, so is 
the public's. We recognize that Plaintiffs have 
also made a strong showing that their 
interests will be injured by a grant of the stay. 
However, given that the first two factors are 
the most critical, and the State has made a 
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strong showing regarding each, a stay is 
appropriate. We have addressed only the 
issues necessary to rule on the motion for a 
stay pending appeal, and our determinations 
are for that purpose and do not bind the merits 
panel. 
IT IS ORDERED that Appellants' opposed 
motion for stay pending appeal is 
GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, 
and that the district court's injunction orders 
are STAYED until the final disposition of 
this appeal, in accordance with this opinion. 
STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit 
Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part: 
I too would deny the State's motion for a 
blanket stay of the district court judgment 
entered on August 29, 2014, pending appeal. 
I agree with a stay of the district court's facial 
invalidation of the admitting-privileges 
requirement because the plaintiffs did not 
request that relief. Second, I agree with a stay 
to allow enforcement of the operational 
requirements of the ambulatory surgical 
center ("ASC") provision because the district 
court only evaluated the burdens imposed by 
the provision's physical plant requirements. 
Applying H.B. 2's severability provision, 
however, I would not stay the district court's 
facial invalidation of the physical plant 
requirements. Finally, I would narrow the 
stay so that it does not reach the admission-
privileges requirement as applied to the 
McAllen and El Paso clinics, which the 
district court found would result in closure of 
all clinics west and south of San Antonio. 
As to the first stay factor, the district court 
found, after trial with witness credibility 
determinations, that an undue burden existed 
because Texas had over forty abortion clinics 
prior to the enactment of H.B. 2, and that after 
the ASC provision takes effect, only seven or 
eight clinics will remain, representing more 
than an 80% reduction in clinics statewide in 
nearly fourteen months, with a 100% 
reduction in clinics west and south of San 
Antonio. The district court further found that 
there was no credible evidence of medical or 
health benefit associated with the ASC 
requirement in the abortion context. At this 
emergency stay point, the State does not 
challenge as clear error either set of factual 
findings. Weighing lack of medical benefit 
against the significant reduction in clinic 
access, the district court found the burden to 
be "undue." 
The majority opinion disagrees, concluding 
especially that the district court "erred when 
it balanced the efficacy of the ambulatory 
surgical center provision against the burdens 
the provision imposed." For my part, I do not 
read Abbott II to preclude consideration of 
the relationship between the severity of the 
obstacle imposed and the weight of the State's 
interest in determining if the burden is 
"undue." Although I agree with the majority 
opinion that Abbott II rejected the district 
court's assessment of empirical data as part of 
its rational-basis analysis, Abbott II did not 
expressly disclaim such an inquiry for 
purposes of the undue-burden prong. In 
Abbott II—in contrast to the district court's 
factual findings in this case—our court 
concluded that there had been "no showing 
whatsoever that any woman [would] lack 
reasonable access to a clinic within Texas." 
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In light of the minimal or non-existent burden 
found on that record, the court in Abbott II 
did not need to conduct an in-depth analysis 
of the State's interest as part of its undue-
burden review. Other courts' criticism of 
Abbott II on this ground is therefore inexact.  
Consistent with this analysis, the district 
court considered the weight of the State's 
interest in its undue-burden review. In doing 
so, the district court adhered to reasoning that 
reconciles, rather than divides, circuit 
authority applying Casey's undue-burden 
test.  
I also do not see a strong likelihood of legal 
error related to the district court's 
demographic calculations pertaining to 
impact on women, relevant both to its facial 
invalidation of the ASC provision, as well as 
to our stay factors. First, the district court 
recognized that there are 5.4 million women 
of reproductive age in Texas. Next, the 
district court found that if the ASC provision 
goes into effect, 900,000 women will live 
more than 150 miles from an abortion clinic; 
750,000 women will live more than 200 
miles from a clinic; and some women will 
live as far as 500 miles or more from a clinic. 
Furthermore, the district court explicitly 
considered the financial and other practical 
obstacles that interact with and compound the 
burdens imposed by the law, both in it its 
discernment of a substantial obstacle and also 
in its assessment of impact on women. 
Finally, the district court also found that the 
remaining seven or eight abortion ASCs lack 
sufficient capacity to accommodate all 
women seeking abortions in the state. Indeed, 
these remaining clinics would have to 
increase by at least fourfold the number of 
abortions they perform annually. Altogether, 
although the district court did not use the 
phrase "large fraction," its findings—which 
related not only to travel distances but also to 
other practical obstacles—demonstrate that 
enforcement of the ASC provision will likely 
affect a significant number and a large 
fraction of women across the state of Texas.  
As to the remaining stay factors, which 
reasonable minds may balance differently, 
and in this case do, it is nonetheless 
undisputed that the State for decades has not 
held plaintiffs' clinics to ASC standards—
indeed, never until now. Based on the record 
established at trial, assessed firsthand by the 
district court, I do not perceive that Texas has 
demonstrated urgency, medical or otherwise, 
to immediate enforcement. After hearing 
conflicting expert testimony, the district 
court found that "abortion in Texas [is] 
extremely safe with particularly low rates of 
serious complications," and further found 
that "risks are not appreciably lowered for 
patients who undergo abortion at ambulatory 
surgical centers." The denial of a stay would 
preserve this status quo pending our court's 
ultimate decision on the correctness of the 
district court's ruling.  
On the other hand, the district court found 
that if the ASC requirement goes into effect 
plaintiffs likely will suffer substantial injury, 
notably that enforcement would cause clinics 
to close in Corpus Christi, San Antonio, 
Austin, McAllen, El Paso, Houston, and 
Dallas. The longer these clinics remain 
closed, the less likely they are to reopen if this 
court affirms that the law is unconstitutional. 
The district court further found that only 
seven or eight clinics will remain open, and 
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that these clinics alone lack sufficient 
capacity. Unless shown to be clear error, this 
circumstance is comparable to the one the 
Seventh Circuit observed would subject 
patients "to weeks of delay because of the 
sudden shortage of eligible [clinics]—and 
delay in obtaining an abortion can result in 
the progression of a pregnancy to a stage at 
which an abortion would be less safe, and 
eventually illegal."  
Agreeing not to impose a blanket stay on 
direct appeal, but not having convinced 
colleagues whom I respect as to the scope of 
the stay that is appropriate, I would grant the 
State's independent request to expedite its 
appeal of an underlying issue that has 
complexity which divides courts, as well as 
profundity which divides convictions deeper 
than the rules of law courts must apply. 
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“Supreme Court Allows Texas Abortion Clinics to Stay Open” 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
October 14, 2014 
 
The Supreme Court on Tuesday allowed 
more than a dozen Texas abortion clinics to 
reopen, blocking a state law that had imposed 
strict requirements on abortion providers. 
Had the law been allowed to stand, it would 
have caused all but eight of the state’s 
abortion clinics to close and would have 
required many women to travel more than 
150 miles to the nearest abortion provider. 
The Supreme Court’s order — five sentences 
long and with no explanation of the justices’ 
reasoning — represents an interim step in a 
legal fight that is far from over. But abortion 
rights advocates welcomed what they said 
was the enormous practical impact of the 
move. Had the clinics been forced to remain 
closed while appeals went forward, they said, 
they might never have reopened. 
State officials said the law’s requirements 
were needed to protect women’s health. 
Abortion providers said the regulations were 
expensive, unnecessary and a ruse meant to 
put many of them out of business. 
The justices addressed two parts of the Texas 
law that the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit had provisionally let 
stand while it considered an appeal. 
One of them required all abortion clinics in 
the state to meet the standards for 
“ambulatory surgical centers,” including 
regulations concerning buildings, equipment 
and staffing. The other required doctors 
performing abortions to have admitting 
privileges at a nearby hospital. 
The Supreme Court, in an unsigned order 
apparently reflecting the views of six justices, 
blocked the surgical-center requirement 
entirely and the admitting-privileges 
requirement as it applied to clinics in 
McAllen, Tex., and El Paso. 
Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas 
and Samuel A. Alito Jr. said they would have 
allowed the law to be enforced. 
Abortion rights advocates praised the order. 
“Tomorrow, 13 clinics across the state will be 
allowed to reopen and provide women with 
safe and legal abortion care in their own 
communities,” said Nancy Northup, 
president of the Center for Reproductive 
Rights, adding that advocates were still 
pursuing appeals. “This fight against Texas’ 
sham abortion law is not over.” 
The appeals court’s decision had left only 
eight clinics open in Texas, all clustered in 
metropolitan regions in the eastern part of the 
state. No abortion facilities were operating 
west or south of San Antonio. 
“If the stay entered by the Fifth Circuit is not 
vacated,” lawyers with the Center for 
Reproductive Rights told the Supreme Court, 
“the clinics forced to remain closed during 
the appeals process will likely never reopen.” 
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The appeals court’s ruling, the center’s brief 
said, meant that “over 900,000 Texas women 
of reproductive age, more than a sixth of all 
such women in Texas, now reside more than 
150 miles from the nearest Texas abortion 
provider, up from 86,000 prior to the 
enactment of the challenged act.” 
In response, Greg Abbott, Texas’ attorney 
general and the Republican candidate for 
governor, told the justices that “it is 
undisputed that the vast majority of Texas 
residents (more than 83 percent) still live 
within a comfortable driving distance (150 
miles)” of an abortion clinic in compliance 
with the law. Others live in parts of the state, 
he said, that did not have nearby clinics in the 
first place. 
Those in the El Paso area, Mr. Abbott 
continued, could obtain abortions across the 
state line in New Mexico. 
The appeals court, drawing on the Supreme 
Court’s last major abortion decision, said the 
law’s challengers had not shown that a “large 
fraction” of women seeking abortions would 
face an unconstitutional burden thanks to the 
law. 
The law in question, which includes some of 
the nation’s toughest abortion restrictions, 
was enacted last year by the Republican-led 
Legislature. Before it came into force, 41 
medical practices were licensed to provide 
abortions in Texas. 
The law was passed after a marathon 
filibuster that turned a Democratic state 
senator, Wendy Davis, into a national 
political star and set the stage for her 
campaign for governor against Mr. Abbott. 
“The court recognized that these deeply 
personal decisions should be made by a 
woman with the guidance of her family and 
her doctor,” Ms. Davis said Tuesday night in 
a statement. “The actions by Austin 
politicians like Greg Abbott had closed all 
but eight Texas reproductive health centers 
and harmed the health and safety of hundreds 
of thousands of women throughout the state.” 
In August, Judge Lee Yeakel of the Federal 
District Court in Austin ruled that the 
surgical-center rule imposed an 
unconstitutional burden on women seeking 
abortions. The number and location of the 
clinics it would effectively close, the judge 
wrote, burdened the exercise of a 
constitutional right for many women “just as 
drastically as a complete ban on abortion.” 
On Tuesday, Yvonne Gutierrez, the 
executive director of Planned Parenthood’s 
Texas political action committee, said the 
Supreme Court’s action was a rebuke to Mr. 
Abbott. 
“Today the Supreme Court ruled that Greg 
Abbott cannot force nearly a million Texas 
women to drive over 300 miles to access their 
constitutionally protected right to safe and 
legal abortion,” Ms. Gutierrez said, adding 
that the justices had rejected his contention 
that the law created a “manageable 
inconvenience.” 
A spokeswoman for Mr. Abbott, Lauren 
Bean, said on Tuesday night, “The attorney 
general’s office will continue to defend the 
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law, just as we defend all state laws when 
they are challenged in court.” 
Last November, the Supreme Court, in a 5-
to-4 ruling, rejected a request to intercede in 
a separate case challenging the law, one that 
centered on the admitting-privileges 
requirement. In dissent, Justice Stephen G. 
Breyer said he expected the Supreme Court 
to agree to hear an appeal in that case 
regardless of how the Fifth Circuit ultimately 
ruled. 
A three-judge panel of the appeals court 
upheld the admitting-privileges requirement 
in March. On Thursday, the full Fifth Circuit 
refused, 12 to 3, to reconsider that ruling. In 
light of Justice Breyer’s comment, Supreme 
Court review of the admitting-privileges case 
appears likely. 
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“Court Upholds Texas Limits on Abortion” 
The New York Times 
Manny Fernandez and Erick Eckholm 
June 9, 2015
A federal appellate court upheld some of the 
toughest provisions of a Texas abortion law 
on Tuesday, putting about half of the state’s 
remaining abortion clinics at risk of 
permanently shutting their doors and leaving 
the nation’s second-most populous state with 
fewer than a dozen clinics across its more 
than 267,000 square miles. There were 41 
when the law was passed. 
 
Abortion providers and women’s rights 
groups vowed a quick appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, setting the stage for 
what could be the most far-reaching ruling in 
years on when legislative restrictions pose an 
“undue burden” on the constitutional right to 
an abortion. 
 
A three-judge panel of the appellate court, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, in New Orleans, sided for the most 
part with Texas and the abortion law the 
Republican-dominated Legislature passed in 
2013, known as House Bill 2. 
 
The judges ruled that Texas can require all 
abortion clinics in the state to meet the same 
building, equipment and staffing standards 
that hospital-style surgical centers must meet, 
which could force numerous clinics to close, 
abortion rights advocates said. 
 
In addition to the surgical standards, the court 
upheld a requirement that doctors performing 
abortions obtain admitting  
privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of a 
clinic. The court said that except as applied to 
one doctor working in McAllen in South 
Texas, the provision did not put an 
unconstitutional burden on women seeking 
abortions. 
 
Texas lawmakers argued that the provisions 
were intended to improve safety. But major 
medical associations say these measures do 
not improve patient safety, and abortion 
rights advocates say they are really intended 
to restrict access to abortion. 
 
Under the 1973 Roe v Wade decision and 
later cases, the Supreme Court has permitted 
a wide array of abortion regulations, 
including waiting periods and parental 
consent for minors, but said states may not 
impose an “undue burden” on the right to an 
abortion before a fetus is viable outside the 
womb. 
 
Throughout the ruling, the Fifth Circuit 
judges cited the explanations given by the 
Texas Legislature for what is considered one 
of the most restrictive abortions laws in the 
country. 
 
“Texas’ stated purpose for enacting H.B. 2 
was to provide the highest quality of care to 
women seeking abortions and to protect the 
health and welfare of women seeking 
abortions,” the Fifth Circuit ruling read. 
“There is no question that this is a legitimate 
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purpose that supports regulating physicians 
and the facilities in which they perform 
abortions.” 
 
But clinic owners, women’s health groups 
and the American Civil Liberties Union said 
that if the Fifth Circuit’s decision were to take 
effect, the results would be “devastating” for 
women seeking abortions in Texas. 
 
“Not since before Roe v. Wade has a law or 
court decision had the potential to devastate 
access to reproductive health care on such a 
sweeping scale,” said Nancy Northup, the 
president and chief executive of the Center 
for Reproductive Rights, whose lawyers were 
part of the legal team representing the clinics 
that sued the state. “Once again, women 
across the state of Texas face the near total 
elimination of safe and legal options for 
ending a pregnancy, and the denial of their 
constitutional rights.” 
 
The decision by the Fifth Circuit, regarded as 
one of the most conservative federal 
appellate courts in the country, is expected to 
take effect in about 22 days. In the meantime, 
however, the clinics and their lawyers plan to 
ask the court to stay the decision while they 
appeal it. If the Fifth Circuit declines, the 
clinic lawyers said, they will seek an 
emergency stay from the Supreme Court that 
would prevent the ruling from taking effect 
while the Supreme Court considered whether 
to hear the case. 
 
There are 18 facilities providing abortions in 
Texas, and if and when the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision goes into effect, eight clinics will 
close and 10 facilities are expected to remain 
open, largely because they are ambulatory 
surgery centers or have relationships with 
such centers, according to Dr. Daniel 
Grossman, an investigator with the Texas 
Policy Evaluation Project and one of the 
experts who testified for the clinics in the 
case. But the fate of at least one of the 
facilities expected to stay open, a clinic in 
McAllen in the Rio Grande Valley, remained 
uncertain. 
 
Lawyers for the Texas clinics that sued the 
state said about 900,000 reproductive-age 
women will live more than 150 miles from 
the nearest open facility in the state when the 
surgical-center requirement and admitting-
privileges rule take effect. 
 
The Fifth Circuit panel found that the 
percentage of affected women who would 
face travel distances of 150 miles or more 
amounted to 17 percent, a figure that it said 
was not a “large fraction.” An abortion 
regulation cannot be invalidated unless it 
imposes an undue burden on what the 
Supreme Court has termed “a large fraction 
of relevant cases.” 
 
Previously, a panel of the same federal 
appeals court ruled that Mississippi could not 
force its only remaining abortion clinic to 
close by arguing that women could always 
travel to neighboring states for the procedure. 
But the panel in the Texas case on Tuesday 
held that the closing of a clinic in El Paso — 
which left the nearest in-state clinic some 550 
miles to the east — was permissible because 
many women had already been traveling to 
New Mexico for abortions, and because the 
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rule did not close all the abortion clinics in 
Texas. 
 
In the case of the McAllen clinic, the sole 
abortion provider in the Rio Grande Valley, 
Tuesday’s decision held that the distance of 
235 miles or more to the nearest clinic did 
pose an undue burden. For now, at least, the 
Fifth Circuit panel exempted that clinic from 
aspects of the surgical-center and admitting-
privileges requirements. But Amy Hagstrom 
Miller, the chief executive of Whole 
Woman’s Health, which runs the McAllen 
facility and was one of the abortion providers 
that sued the state, said the organization was 
evaluating whether the ruling would permit 
the clinic to continue operating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Texas attorney general, Ken Paxton, 
called the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding 
the law a “victory for life and women’s 
health.” 
 
“H.B. 2 both protects the unborn and ensures 
Texas women are not subjected to unsafe and 
unhealthy conditions,” Mr. Paxton said in a 
statement. “Today’s decision by the Fifth 
Circuit validates that the people of Texas 
have authority to establish safe, common-
sense standards of care necessary to ensure 
the health of women.” 
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“Texas Abortion Case Reaches the Court” 
SCOTUSblog 
Lyle Denniston 
June 19, 2015 
Abortion clinics and doctors in Texas asked 
the Supreme Court on Friday night to delay 
enforcement of a 2013 state abortion law 
while an appeal to the Justices is pursued.  
Without a postponement, the lengthy 
application said, more than half of the 
existing nineteen clinics in Texas will have to 
close on July 1, and some of them might 
never reopen. 
 
The delay request was filed with Justice 
Antonin Scalia, who handles emergency 
legal filings from the geographic region that 
includes Texas – the Fifth Circuit.  He has the 
option of acting on his own or sharing the 
issue with his colleagues. 
 
Late Friday afternoon, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused, by a 
two-to-one vote, to delay its June 9 ruling 
upholding most of the Texas law.  It did 
modify slightly a part of that ruling in order 
to give one clinic — in McAllen, in the Rio 
Grande Valley — more time to adapt to the 
new restrictions. 
 
Circuit Judge Edward C. Prado would have 
put the entire ruling on hold.  His two 
colleagues, Circuit Judges Jennifer Walker 
Elrod and Catharina Haynes, turned down the 
challengers’ delay request except for the 
temporary reprieve for the McAllen clinic. 
 
Because the law is now due to go into effect 
in twelve days, the Court is likely to act on 
the postponement application before then.  
The clinics and doctors will be filing a formal 
petition for review later, but the Court 
probably would not act on that until its next 
Term, starting in October.  The Justices 
expect to finish their current Term at the end 
of this month or soon after that. 
 
The Court is currently considering whether to 
review an appeal by the state of Mississippi 
to put back into effect a state abortion law 
that is generally understood will lead to the 
closing of the last remaining clinic in that 
state. 
 
The Texas case is entirely separate from that 
Mississippi dispute.  Two provisions of the 
Texas law are at issue: a requirement that any 
clinic performing abortions must have 
facilities equal to those of a surgical center, 
and a requirement that any doctor performing 
abortions must have patient-admitting 
privileges at a nearby hospital. 
 
In asking for a delay of those provisions 
Friday, the clinics and doctors told the Court 
that the effect of those limitations would 
mean a “seventy-five percent reduction in 
Texas abortion facilities in just a two-year 
period, creating a severe shortage of safe and 
legal abortion services in a state that is home 
to more than five million reproductive-age 
women.” 
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Before the new law began taking effect, there 
were some forty-one abortion clinics 
throughout Texas.  Some clinics were able to 
reopen after the Supreme Court, in a 
temporary order last October, put some limits 
on the state law’s scope. 
 
Under the new Fifth Circuit ruling, the 
application said, nineteen clinics are 
currently providing abortion services.  But, 
without a delay by the Supreme Court of the 
lower court decision, it added, ten of those 
nineteen would have to close as of July 1.  An 
eleventh clinic, in McAllen, it said, would be 
limited to providing abortions to women in 
four counties using a single doctor. 
 
It also said that a twelfth facility that has 
applied for a state license in order to reopen 
would not be able to do so, under the Fifth 
Court ruling. 
 
“The fate of a dozen clinics — and the many 
women who would otherwise obtain 
abortions at those clinics — will be 
determined by the outcome” of the 
postponement request, the application added. 
 
The clinics and doctors have insisted all 
along that the two provisions they are 
challenging are not necessary medically at 
abortion clinics, and will only have the effect 
of denying access to more women seeking to 
end their pregnancies, even for medical 
reasons. 
 
Texas has strongly defended the surgical 
facilities and admitting privileges 
requirements, arguing that they are necessary 
to protect women’s health.   State officials 
probably will get a chance to reply to the 
delay application before Justice Scalia or the 
full Court acts. 
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“Judge Garza Really Disagrees with the Miss. Abortion-Clinic 
Opinion” 
Find Law 
William Peacock 
July 31, 2014 
A Fifth Circuit panel on Tuesday upheld an 
injunction against the enforcement of a 
Mississippi statute requiring physicians 
providing abortions to have admitting 
privileges at a nearby hospital as it applied to 
the state's last remaining clinic. It did so 
despite binding authority from earlier this 
year -- a different panel's decision upholding 
a substantially similar law out of Texas. 
The majority justified the split from authority 
by pointing to a 1938 segregation-in-
education case -- an Equal Protection 
holding, even though this is a Due Process 
dispute. Circuit Judge Emilio Garza was so 
dumbfounded by the majority's reasoning 
that his dissent more than doubles the length 
of the opinion -- from 18 to 37 pages long. 
n his dissent, Garza takes issue with every 
single premise in the majority's opinion, 
while saving a few pages' worth of wrath 
for Planned Parenthood v. Casey itself. We'll 
hold off on reiterating his rant, which echoes 
many that have come before him (standard-
less standard of Casey comes from Harlan's 
sloppy dissent in Poe v. Ullman, which has 
led to decades of sloppy judicial activism 
based in politics) and instead look at his 
issues with the case at hand. 
H.B. 1390 Doesn't Close Clinics (Directly) 
Garza starts by noting that this isn't state 
action: The law requires physicians to get 
admitting privileges -- that's it. 
Five hospitals in the area around the clinic 
declined to extend those privileges. Hospitals 
choosing not to extend privileges is private 
action, action which may conflict with 
federal law. ("Federal law, however, 
prohibits entities receiving certain funding or 
contracts from discriminating 'in the 
extension of staff or other privileges to any 
physician ... because he performed or assisted 
in the performance of a lawful sterilization 
procedure or abortion ...'") This case isn't 
about possibly illegal private action, however 
-- it's about review of a state law. 
"The independent decisions of private 
hospitals have no place in our review of state 
action under the Constitution," Judge Garza 
wrote. 
How Far of a Drive Is Too Far? 
Our first reaction to the holding in this case 
was, "What about Abbot?" Right or wrong, 
the Fifth Circuit, just this past March, upheld 
a similar law out of Texas. Judge Garza is 
wondering the same thing: 
"Applying Casey, a panel of this Court 
recently concluded that 'an increase of travel 
of less than 150 miles for some women is not 
an undue burden,'" Garza wrote. "The 
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majority gives these binding principles a 
passing nod [...] before setting them aside for 
the sole reason that this case happens to 
involve the crossing of state borders to obtain 
abortion services." 
He also took issue with the majority's citation 
of Casey as support for the proposition that 
crossing state lines is an undue burden on the 
right to obtain an abortion: 
"In the majority's view, the Casey Court's 
failure to 'mention or consider the potential 
availability of abortions ... in surrounding 
states' implies that we must confine our 
undue burden analysis to Mississippi. [...] 
Such an inference is legally nonsensical: No 
such rule exists. Casey dealt with the 
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute 
imposing various informed consent and 
spousal notification requirements on women 
seeking abortion services in that state, and the 
Court had no occasion to consider abortion 
access in nearby states. The lack of a squarely 
applicable precedent means only that the 
question remains open." 
Gaines Is Apples and Oranges 
In Gaines, the Supreme Court held that a 
state has an obligation "to give the protection 
of equal laws" regardless of "what another 
State may do or fail to do." (Emphasis in 
dissent.) 
The key words are "equal" and 
"protection:" Gaines "governs each state's 
obligations solely under the Equal Protection 
Clause, not under the Constitution at large, 
much less the substantive component of the 
Due Process Clause," Judge Garza 
concluded. 
Another significant distinction: In Gaines, 
the state was dealing with a service that it was 
obligated to provide equally: providing an 
education to students within its borders. 
Here? The state is not, and is not required to, 
provide abortions. 
We're Going to Need a Bigger Record 
Despite the lengthy dissent, Judge Garza 
wasn't ready to hand the case to Mississippi 
outright. He noted that the correct test would 
be to follow Casey andAbbott to see if the 
distance traveled would amount to an undue 
burden. 
Such a test, of course, would almost certainly 
come out in Mississippi's favor. As Garza 
points out, before the Act's passage, nearly 60 
percent of Mississippi women seeking an 
abortion already went out of state. Plus, as 
Mississippi has been arguing all along, 
neighboring out-of-state clinics exist within 
driving distance of Jackson. 
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“Judges Block Abortion Curb in Mississippi” 
The New York Times 
Campbell Robertson & Erik Eckholm 
July 29, 2014 
A federal appeals panel on Tuesday blocked 
a Mississippi law that would have shut the 
sole abortion clinic in the state by requiring 
its doctors to obtain admitting privileges at 
local hospitals, something they had been 
unable to do. 
By a 2-to-1 vote, the panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
ruled that by imposing a law that would 
effectively end abortion in the state, 
Mississippi would illegally shift its 
constitutional obligations to neighboring 
states. The ruling is the latest at a time when 
states, particularly in the South, are 
increasingly setting new restrictions that 
supporters say address safety issues and that 
critics say are intended to shut clinics. 
“A state cannot lean on its sovereign 
neighbors to provide protection of its 
citizens’ federal constitutional rights,” Judge 
E. Grady Jolly wrote. 
“Pre-viability, a woman has the 
constitutional right to end her pregnancy by 
abortion,” he continued. This law 
“effectively extinguishes that right within 
Mississippi’s borders.” 
Mississippi officials had argued that women 
seeking abortions could always drive to 
neighboring states, such as Louisiana or 
Tennessee, to obtain the procedure, an 
argument the panel rejected. 
The decision did not overturn the Mississippi 
law or explore whether the admitting-
privilege requirement was justified on safety 
grounds. Rather, the panel said, the law could 
not be used to close the sole clinic in the state. 
The opinion preserved an existing stay while 
the substantive issues were considered 
further by a Federal District Court. But it set 
a clear principle of state responsibility that 
the lower court must apply to this case. 
Laurence H. Tribe, a professor of 
constitutional law at Harvard, said that the 
principle of state responsibility enunciated by 
the circuit court “is deeply established and 
fully entrenched.” 
“It goes not only to the issue of reproductive 
freedom but to the very character of the 
federal union,” he said. 
Mississippi officials did not say whether the 
state would appeal. 
“We are reviewing the ruling and considering 
our options,” said Jan Schaefer, a 
spokeswoman for Jim Hood, Mississippi’s 
attorney general. 
State Representative Sam C. Mims, who was 
the chief sponsor of the law, expressed 
disappointment with the ruling, saying that 
the decision reflected a misinterpretation of 
its purpose. 
“Abortion is still legal throughout the nation 
and, of course, still legal in Mississippi,” he 
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said. “This legislation did not deal with that; 
it only dealt with the regulation of abortion 
clinics.” 
Supporters of abortion rights were pleased 
but wary. 
“The fact that the Mississippi clinic can stay 
open is good news, but there are a lot of other 
cases pending in federal courts, and it’s 
impossible to know if those laws will be 
upheld or struck down,” said Elizabeth Nash, 
who analyzes state laws for the Guttmacher 
Institute, a private research group that 
supports abortion rights. 
Similar laws have been temporarily blocked 
by federal courts in Alabama, Kansas and 
Wisconsin while they have taken effect in 
Missouri, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas 
and Utah. 
In March, a panel from the same appeals 
court, composed of different judges, upheld a 
Texas law requiring admitting privileges, 
ruling that the closing of some but not all 
clinics within a state did not present an undue 
burden to women seeking abortion. About 
one-third of the abortion clinics in Texas 
have shut in the last year because of the 
requirement, leaving 22 open and forcing 
women in some parts of the state to drive 
more than 100 miles to obtain an abortion. 
On Monday, two affected clinics in Texas are 
mounting a new legal challenge and clinic 
operators will also ask a Federal District 
Court to block enforcement of a more drastic 
requirement scheduled to take effect on Sept. 
1 — that abortion clinics meet the building 
standards of ambulatory surgery centers. 
That rule could reduce the number of centers 
operating in the state to fewer than 10. 
While the Texas and Mississippi laws were 
nearly identical, the judges found that the 
effect in Mississippi, with a single clinic, 
made the law there, passed by a large and 
bipartisan majority in 2012, constitutionally 
distinct from the one in Texas. 
Nearly everyone involved with the law in 
Mississippi acknowledged from the outset 
that it would shutter the Jackson Women’s 
Health Organization, which is north of 
downtown Jackson. The clinic’s challenge to 
the law was argued by the Center for 
Reproductive Rights, a New York group. 
Politicians at the time of the law’s passage, 
including the governor, welcomed the 
closing as a likely outcome. The two 
physicians who perform nearly all abortions 
at the clinic, neither of whom live full-time in 
Jackson, tried and failed to obtain admitting 
privileges at all seven hospitals in the area. 
When they appeared before the appeals panel 
in April, lawyers representing the state did 
not dispute that the law would force the 
clinic’s closing, instead echoing arguments 
made about the Texas law: that it was not an 
undue burden for women to have to drive a 
longer distance. 
Mississippi is “surrounded by major 
metropolitan areas where abortion clinics are 
available,” said Paul E. Barnes of the 
Mississippi attorney general’s office. The 
judges at the time pointed out that such 
options might narrow considerably with the 
passage of similar laws in Louisiana and 
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Alabama, a point raised again in a footnote to 
Tuesday’s opinion. 
In a dissent, Judge Emilio M. Garza agreed 
with Mississippi’s arguments, saying that the 
law was a reasonable effort to regulate and 
add safeguards to abortions. Disputing the 
central premise of the opinion, he wrote that 
“no state is obligated to provide or guarantee 
the provision of abortion services within its 
borders.” 
Major medical associations including the 
American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists have said that requiring clinic 
doctors to have admitting privileges has no 
effect on medical safety. In an emergency, 
patients would be sent to local emergency 
rooms and be treated by specialists in any 
case. 
Many hospitals provide admitting privileges 
only to doctors who admit a minimum 
number of patients each year — a threshold 
many abortion providers cannot meet 
because serious medical crises are rare and, 
in the case of the Jackson clinic, because the 
doctors visit from elsewhere. 
Other hospitals, especially in conservative 
and rural areas, have refused to grant 
privileges to abortion clinic doctors in order 
to avoid controversy. 
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“Supreme Court Takes No Action on Mississippi Abortion Law” 
NBC News 
Pete Williams 
June 30, 2015 
The U.S. Supreme Court today took no action 
on a dispute over a Mississippi abortion law 
that requires doctors performing abortions to 
have admitting privileges at local hospitals. 
As a result, the law will remain on hold for 
several more months — perhaps until the 
court decides whether to take a similar law 
from Texas. The Supreme Court Monday 
blocked enforcement of the Texas law while 
it's on appeal. 
Passed by the state legislature in 2012, the 
Mississippi law was blocked by lower courts, 
which found that it would effectively force 
the state's only licensed abortion clinic to shut 
down. 
The state argued that the law would not 
unduly burden the right of access to abortion 
services, because many women in 
Mississippi could go to nearby clinics in 
Tennessee, Louisiana, and Alabama. But the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
"Mississippi may not shift its obligation with 
respect to the established constitutional rights 
of its citizens to another state." 
In a more recent ruling, a different panel of 
the same appeals court said that requiring 
women to leave Texas for abortion services 
is not necessarily unconstitutional. That 
decision came in the separate dispute over the 
2013 Texas abortion law. 
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MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem 
Ruling Below: MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (D.N.D. 2014) 
Plaintiff MKB Management Corporation, doing business as the Red River Women's Clinic, is the 
sole abortion provider in North Dakota. Before North Dakota’s H.B. 1456 took effect, the 
plaintiffs brought suit in the district court, challenging the law's constitutionality and seeking 
injunctive relief. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation 
of H.B. 1456. The plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment, arguing H.B. 1456 violates the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  
The district court found that "[a] woman's constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy before 
viability has consistently been upheld by the United States Supreme Court for more than forty 
years since Roe v. Wade.” Concluding that "H.B. 1456 clearly prohibits pre-viability abortions in 
a very significant percentage of cases in North Dakota, thereby imposing an undue burden on 
women seeking to obtain an abortion," the district court granted summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs, permanently enjoining H.B. 1456.  The State now appeals. 
Question Presented: Whether North Dakota could prohibit physicians from aborting unborn 
children who possessed detectable heartbeats. 
 
 
MKB MANAGEMENT CORP., doing business as Red River Women’s Clinic; Kathryn L. 
Eggleston, M.D. 
Plaintiffs – Appellees 
v. 
Wayne STENEHJEM, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of North 
Dakota, et. al. 
Defendants – Appellants 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
Filed on July 22, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge. 
This case presents the question whether, 
given the current state of medical science, a 
state generally may prohibit physicians from 
aborting unborn children who possess 
detectable heartbeats. The district court held 
that it may not. Because United States 
Supreme Court precedent does not permit us 
to reach a contrary result, we affirm. 
I. 
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North Dakota has, for a number of years, 
prohibited abortion "[a]fter the point in 
pregnancy when the unborn child may 
reasonably be expected to have reached 
viability," except when necessary to preserve 
the life or health of the mother. North Dakota 
defines "viable" as "the ability of an unborn 
child to live outside the mother's womb, 
albeit with artificial aid."  
In 2013, North Dakota passed House Bill 
1456, which extends the general prohibition 
on abortion to the point in pregnancy when 
the unborn child possesses a detectable 
heartbeat. H.B. 1456 contains two operative 
provisions. The first requires a physician 
performing an abortion to "determin[e], in 
accordance with standard medical practice, if 
the unborn child the pregnant woman is 
carrying has a detectable heartbeat." This 
requirement does not apply "when a medical 
emergency exists that prevents compliance." 
A physician who violates the heartbeat 
testing requirement is subject to disciplinary 
action before the state board of medical 
examiners.  
The second operative provision prohibits a 
physician from performing an abortion on a 
pregnant woman if the unborn child has a 
"heartbeat [that] has been detected according 
to the requirements of section 1." There are 
exceptions for the life or health of the 
pregnant woman and for the life of another 
unborn child. A physician who violates this 
provision commits a felony. The pregnant 
woman, however, is not subject to liability.  
Plaintiff MKB Management Corporation, 
doing business as the Red River Women's 
Clinic, is the sole abortion provider in North 
Dakota. Plaintiff Dr. Kathryn Eggelston is a 
board-certified family medicine physician, 
licensed to practice in North Dakota, who 
serves as the Clinic's medical director and 
provides abortions to the Clinic's patients. 
The defendants are the State's Attorney for 
the county in which the Clinic is located,  the 
North Dakota Attorney General, and the 
members of the North Dakota Board of 
Medical Examiners, all in their official 
capacities (collectively, the "State"). 
Before H.B. 1456 took effect, the plaintiffs 
brought suit in the district court, challenging 
the law's constitutionality and seeking 
injunctive relief. The district court granted a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the 
implementation of H.B. 1456. The plaintiffs 
then moved for summary judgment, arguing 
H.B. 1456 violates the Due Process Clause of 
the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs 
submitted declarations from Dr. Eggleston 
and Dr. Christie Iverson, a board-certified 
obstetrician and gynecologist licensed in 
North Dakota, both stating that fetal cardiac 
activity is detectable by about 6 weeks and 
that a fetus is not viable until about 24 weeks. 
In response, the State submitted the 
declaration of Dr. Jerry Obritsch, a board-
certified obstetrician and gynecologist 
licensed in North Dakota, that an unborn 
child's heartbeat is detectable by about 6 to 8 
weeks and that an unborn child is viable from 
conception because in vitro fertilization 
("IVF") "allow[s] an embryonic unborn child 
to live outside the human uterus (womb) for 
2 - 6 days after conception."  
The district court found that "[a] woman's 
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy 
before viability has consistently been upheld 
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by the United States Supreme Court for more 
than forty years since Roe v. Wade." It 
reasoned that "the affidavit of Dr. Obritsch 
does not create a genuine issue [as to when 
viability occurs] primarily because Dr. 
Obritsch uses a different definition of 
viability than the one used by either the 
United States Supreme Court or the medical 
community generally." Concluding that 
"H.B. 1456 clearly prohibits pre-viability 
abortions in a very significant percentage of 
cases in North Dakota, thereby imposing an 
undue burden on women seeking to obtain an 
abortion," the district court granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs, permanently 
enjoining H.B. 1456.  The State now appeals. 
II. 
We review the district court's grant of 
summary judgment de novo and its 
permanent injunction for an abuse of 
discretion.  
The State argues that the Supreme Court has 
called into question the continuing validity of 
its abortion jurisprudence, and that changes 
in the facts underlying Roe and Casey require 
us to overturn those cases. 
The evolution in the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence reflects its increasing 
recognition of states' profound interest in 
protecting unborn children. In 1973, the 
Court announced it would regulate abortion 
according to the trimester framework. 
Although Roe acknowledged there were 
"important state interests in regulation," it 
prohibited states from issuing regulations 
designed to promote their interest in 
"protecting potential life" during the first two 
trimesters of pregnancy. 
By 1992, however, a plurality of the Court 
had rejected the trimester framework because 
it failed to "fulfill Roe's own promise that the 
State has an interest in protecting fetal life or 
potential life." Casey recognized "there is a 
substantial state interest in potential life 
throughout pregnancy." To give this interest 
due consideration, Casey replaced Roe's 
trimester framework with the undue burden 
analysis, under which a state may promote its 
interest in potential life by regulating 
abortion before viability so long as the 
regulation's "purpose or effect is [not] to 
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion."  
Most recently, a majority of the Court, when 
presented with an opportunity to reaffirm 
Casey, chose instead merely to "assume" 
Casey's principles for the purposes of its 
opinion. This mere assumption may, as the 
State suggests, signal the Court's willingness 
to reevaluate its abortion jurisprudence. 
Even so, the Court has yet to overrule the Roe 
and Casey line of cases. Thus we, as an 
intermediate court, are bound by those 
decisions. Neither Gonzales's signal nor the 
alleged change of underlying facts empowers 
us to overrule the Supreme Court.  
Accordingly, we have no choice but to follow 
the majority of the Court in assuming the 
following principles for the purposes of this 
opinion: 
Before viability, a State "may not 
prohibit any woman from making the 
ultimate decision to terminate her 
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pregnancy." It also may not impose 
upon this right an undue burden, 
which exists if a regulation's "purpose 
or effect is to place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion before the fetus 
attains viability." On the other hand, 
"[r]egulations which do no more than 
create a structural mechanism by 
which the State, or the parent or 
guardian of a minor, may express 
profound respect for the life of the 
unborn are permitted, if they are not a 
substantial obstacle to the woman's 
exercise of the right to choose." 
Here, because the parties do not dispute that 
fetal heartbeats are detectable at about 6 
weeks, it is clear that H.B. 1456 generally 
prohibits abortions after that point in a 
pregnancy. Whether such a prohibition is 
permissible under the principles we accept as 
controlling in this case depends on when 
viability occurs: if viability occurs at about 
24 weeks, as the plaintiffs maintain, then 
H.B. 1456 impermissibly prohibits women 
from making the ultimate decision to 
terminate their pregnancies; but if viability 
occurs at conception, as the State argues, then 
no impermissible prohibition ensues. 
Just as we are bound by the Supreme Court's 
assumption of Casey's principles, we are also 
bound by the Court's statement that viability 
is the time "when, in the judgment of the 
attending physician on the particular facts of 
the case before him, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival 
outside the womb, with or without artificial 
support."  
When we recently reviewed an Arkansas 
statute similar to H.B. 1456, we noted "the 
importance of the parties, particularly the 
state, developing the record in a meaningful 
way so as to present a real opportunity for the 
court to examine viability." Here, the 
plaintiffs' declarations, by Drs. Eggleston and 
Iverson, state viability occurs at about 24 
weeks. Dr. Iverson explained she understands 
viability to mean "the time when a fetus has 
a reasonable chance for sustained life outside 
the womb, albeit with lifesaving medical 
intervention." Iverson Dec. at 2. This 
definition is in accordance with the one 
adopted by the Supreme Court. 
The State's declaration, by Dr. Obritsch, 
contends viability occurs at conception 
because IVF "allow[s] an embryonic unborn 
child to live outside the human uterus 
(womb) for 2 - 6 days after conception." 
Obritsch Dec. at 8. While this declaration 
provides some support for the State's 
argument, we agree with the district court 
that Dr. Obrtisch's definition of viability 
differs from the Supreme Court's and thus 
does not create a genuine dispute as to when 
viability occurs. 
Because there is no genuine dispute that H.B. 
1456 generally prohibits abortions before 
viability—as the Supreme Court has defined 
that concept—and because we are bound by 
Supreme Court precedent holding that states 
may not prohibit pre-viability abortions, we 
must affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to the plaintiffs.  
III. 
Although controlling Supreme Court 
precedent dictates the outcome in this case, 
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good reasons exist for the Court to reevaluate 
its jurisprudence. 
A. 
To begin, the Court's viability standard has 
proven unsatisfactory because it gives too 
little consideration to the "substantial state 
interest in potential life throughout 
pregnancy." By deeming viability "the point 
at which the balance of interests tips," the 
Court has tied a state's interest in unborn 
children to developments in obstetrics, not to 
developments in the unborn. This leads to 
troubling consequences for states seeking to 
protect unborn children. For example, 
although "states in the 1970s lacked the 
power to ban an abortion of a 24-week-old-
fetus because that fetus would not have 
satisfied the viability standard of that time, 
[t]oday . . . that same fetus would be 
considered viable, and states would have the 
power to restrict [such] abortions." How it is 
consistent with a state's interest in protecting 
unborn children that the same fetus would be 
deserving of state protection in one year but 
undeserving of state protection in another is 
not clear. The Supreme Court has posited 
there are "logical and biological 
justifications" for choosing viability as the 
critical point. But this choice is better left to 
the states, which might find their interest in 
protecting unborn children better served by a 
more consistent and certain marker than 
viability. Here, the North Dakota legislature 
has determined that the critical point for 
asserting its interest in potential life is the 
point at which an unborn child possesses a 
detectable heartbeat. "To substitute its own 
preference to that of the legislature in this 
area is not the proper role of a court."  
By taking this decision away from the states, 
the Court has also removed the states' ability 
to account for "advances in medical and 
scientific technology [that] have greatly 
expanded our knowledge of prenatal life," 
"[B]ecause the Court's rulings have rendered 
basic abortion policy beyond the power of 
our legislative bodies, the arms of 
representative government may not 
meaningfully debate" medical and scientific 
advances. Thus the Court's viability standard 
fails to fulfill Roe's "promise that the State 
has an interest in protecting fetal life or 
potential life."  
Medical and scientific advances further show 
that the concept of viability is itself subject to 
change. The Court has already acknowledged 
that viability continues to occur earlier in 
pregnancy. When the Court decided Roe in 
1973, viability generally occurred at 28 
weeks. In 1992, viability "sometimes" 
occurred at 23 to 24 weeks. Today, viability 
generally occurs at 24 weeks, but it may 
occur weeks earlier. Dr. Obritsch's 
declaration, although insufficient to create a 
genuine dispute of fact in the face of the 
Supreme Court's current definition of 
viability, shows the concept of viability may 
be attacked from the point of conception 
forward, as well. As IVF and similar 
technologies improve, we can reasonably 
expect the amount of time an "embryonic 
unborn child" may survive outside the womb 
will only increase. The viability standard will 
prove even less workable in the future. 
B. 
Another reason for the Court to reevaluate its 
jurisprudence is that the facts underlying Roe 
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and Casey may have changed. The State has 
presented evidence to that effect and the 
plaintiffs did not contest this evidence at the 
summary judgment stage. The State's 
evidence "goes to the heart of the balance Roe 
struck between the choice of a mother and the 
life of her unborn child." First, "Roe's 
assumption that the decision to abort a baby 
will be made in close consultation with a 
woman's private physician is called into 
question by" declarations from women who 
have had abortions. These declarations state 
women may receive abortions without 
consulting the physician beforehand and 
without receiving follow-up care after, that 
women may not be given information about 
the abortion procedure or its possible 
complications, and that the abortion clinic 
may function "like a mill." The declaration by 
Dr. John Thorp, a board-certified obstetrician 
and gynecologist, further states that 
"coercion or pressure prior to the termination 
of pregnancy occurs with frequency." One 
woman declared her husband threatened to 
kick her out of the house and take her 
children away forever if she did not abort a 
pregnancy that was the product of an affair.  
The declarations from women who have had 
abortions also show abortions may cause 
adverse consequences for the woman's health 
and well-being. One woman reported that 
"[t]he negative effects of my abortion 
resulted in ten years of mental and emotional 
torment." Another reported she "suffered for 
years from depression, anxiety, panic attacks, 
low self-esteem" and "suicidal ideation." Yet 
another reported her abortion caused 
"numerous female health issues, including an 
ectopic pregnancy, chronic bladder 
infections, debilitating menstrual cycles, 
cervical cancer and early hysterectomy." Dr. 
Obritsch also explained some studies support 
a connection between abortion and breast 
cancer. 
We further observe that the pseudonymously 
named plaintiffs in two of the Supreme 
Court's foundational abortion cases later 
advocated against those very decisions. 
Norma McCorvey, the "Jane Roe" of Roe v. 
Wade, sought relief from the judgment in her 
case on the ground that changed factual and 
legal circumstances rendered Roe unjust. 
Roe's companion case, similarly sought relief 
from the judgment in her case. Cano also 
filed an amicus brief in this case arguing "that 
abortion is psychologically damaging to the 
mental and social health of significant 
numbers of women." McCorvey's and Cano's 
renunciations call into question the 
soundness of the factual assumptions of the 
cases purportedly decided in their favor. 
Finally, the State argues that, by enacting a 
law that permits parents to abandon 
unwanted infants at hospitals without 
consequence, it has reduced the burden of 
child care that the Court identified in Roe. In 
short, the continued application of the 
Supreme Court's viability standard discounts 
the legislative branch's recognized interest in 
protecting unborn children. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to 
the plaintiffs and the permanent injunction of 
H.B. 1456.  
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“Abortion and the Law: The Eighth Circuit Court Embarrasses 
Itself” 
The Economist 
August 5, 2015 
 
Last month, Judge Bobby Shepherd of the 
eighth circuit court in Missouri wrote an 
opinion reading more like a novice high-
school debate speech than a ruling by a 
federal appellate judge. The topic was 
abortion—specifically, North Dakota’s 
highly restrictive law banning the procedure 
at the first sign of a fetal heartbeat. Since a 
heartbeat can be heard as early as six weeks 
into a pregnancy, and the Supreme Court has 
said that women have a right to an abortion 
up to the point of viability (i.e., when the 
fetus is capable of surviving outside the 
womb, around 24 weeks), Judge Shepherd 
held, along with two colleagues, that the law 
is unconstitutional. But the 14-page ruling 
closed with a five-page lament: North 
Dakota’s law may be inconsistent with Roe v 
Wade and Casey v Planned Parenthood, but 
the Supreme Court should “re-evaluate its 
jurisprudence”. 
 
Lower courts are not in the habit of chiding 
the Supreme Court so brazenly for getting it 
wrong. But this opinion is most shocking for 
the tortured logic and dubious claims fueling 
its final five pages. 
 
The three-judge panel begins by claiming 
that the viability standard “has proven 
unsatisfactory because it gives too little 
consideration to the ‘substantial state interest 
in potential life throughout pregnancy’”. The 
quotation is from the Casey decision, when 
the Supreme Court abandoned Roe’s 
trimester approach and focused squarely on 
viability as the point at which a state’s 
interest in fetal life becomes “compelling” 
and, thus, when abortion bans become 
permissible. But to say that this tipping point 
“gives too little consideration” to the state’s 
interest in potential life is to ignore what’s on 
the other side of the balance: a right of 
women to terminate their pregnancies, rooted 
in the 14th Amendment’s protection of 
personal liberty in the due-process clause. 
 
Judge Shepherd says the “choice” of when to 
restrict abortion “is better left to the states, 
which might find their interest in protecting 
unborn children better served by a more 
consistent and certain marker than viability.” 
He then declares that North Dakota’s 
marker—“the point at which an unborn child 
possesses a detectable heartbeat”—is as good 
a choice as any. A couple of sentences earlier, 
Judge Shepherd had dismissed viability as 
“tied” to “developments in obstetrics, not to 
developments in the unborn.” Now he 
implies that a woman’s right to an abortion 
may be made contingent on developments in 
fetal-heartbeat-detection technology. And he 
finds no trouble with a national picture where 
North Dakotans have a handful of weeks to 
make a decision about their pregnancies—or 
even less, since it can take a month or more 
for women to realise they are pregnant—
while residents of other states have three or 
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four times that long to consider their options. 
The court seems fine with the scope of 
constitutional rights being defined by where 
one happens to live.   
 
It gets worse. The opinion then calls into 
question the very meaning of “viability”, 
turning to the state’s witness, Dr Jerry 
Obritsch, who claims that “an unborn child is 
viable from conception because in vitro 
fertilization (“IVF”) ‘allow[s] an embryonic 
unborn child to live outside the human uterus 
(womb) for 2 - 6 days after conception.’” 
While the panel notes this view of viability is 
clearly at odds with the Supreme Court’s 
conception, it contends that Dr Obritsch 
“shows the concept of viability may be 
attacked from the point of conception 
forward, as well.” But an embryo is not 
“viable” just because it is able to survive for 
a few days before being implanted in a uterus. 
Test-tube babies do not self-gestate in the 
vial. For the eighth circuit to endorse the state 
witness's sophistry—even haltingly—is an 
embarrassment of judicial reasoning. 
 
The strangest string of arguments to win the 
eighth-circuit panel’s imprimatur concerns 
the purported reality of abortion in America 
today. Some women have abortions without 
adequate medical consultation, Judge 
Shepherd writes, and some receive no follow-
up care after the procedure. The opinion 
again cites Dr Obritsch—“a board-certified 
obstetrician and gynecologist”—who reports 
that “coercion or pressure” often influence a 
woman’s decision to have an abortion: “One 
woman declared her husband threatened to 
kick her out of the house and take her 
children away forever if she did not abort a 
pregnancy that was the product of an affair.” 
 
Leaving aside the dubious I-have-a-single-
expert-who-says-this mode of establishing 
empirical truths—the logic behind these 
arguments is mystifying. Are women less 
entitled to their constitutional rights if they 
happen to be married to an abusive husband? 
Or if their health provider isn’t as attentive as 
they may like? Does a constitutional right 
exercised imperfectly no longer merit 
protection? By that odd measure, the free 
exercise of religion is called into serious 
question when we discover that some Amish 
youth sell methamphetamines. Free speech 
should perhaps be abandoned because 
dogfight videographers and cross burners 
abuse it. And the second amendment’s right 
to bear arms should have been shunted to the 
dustbin right after America’s first mass 
shooting—or at least well before its 71st. 
 
The eighth circuit's opinion—which Slate's 
Dahlia Lithwick rightly finds 
"astonishing"—aims to give the states a free 
hand in policing abortion however they 
choose, and may encourage abortion 
opponents to keep pressing their case to 
reverse over four decades of abortion 
jurisprudence. But it is hard to imagine that 
even the most conservative Supreme Court 
justices will manage to read the opinion 
without wincing.
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“Eighth Circuit Calls for Supreme Court to Reconsider Abortion 
Precedents” 
The National Review 
Ed Whelan 
July 23, 2015 
 
In a decision yesterday (MKB Management 
Corp. v. Stenehjem), a unanimous Eighth 
Circuit panel ruled that a North Dakota law 
that generally prohibits abortion after the 
point at which the “unborn child the pregnant 
woman is carrying has a detectable 
heartbeat” is inconsistent with the rules 
imposed by the Supreme Court in Roe v. 
Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey (1992). Specifically, “fetal heartbeats 
are detectable at about 6 weeks”—long 
before “viability,” as the Court has defined 
that concept. The panel’s reasoning strikes 
me as clearly correct.  
 
To their great credit, the panel—consisting of 
Lavenski R. Smith, William Duane Benton, 
and Bobby E. Shepherd (all Bush 43 
appointees)—did not stop there. Instead, they 
go on, in pages 9 to 13 of the opinion 
authored by Shepherd, to observe and explain 
that “good reasons exist for the Court to 
reevaluate its [abortion] jurisprudence.” 
Some excerpts:  
 
To begin, the Court’s viability 
standard has proven unsatisfactory 
because it gives too little 
consideration to the “substantial state 
interest in potential life throughout 
pregnancy.” By deeming viability 
“the point at which the balance of 
interests tips,” the Court has tied a 
state’s interest in unborn children to 
developments in obstetrics, not to 
developments in the unborn. This 
leads to troubling consequences for 
states seeking to protect unborn 
children. For example, although 
“states in the 1970s lacked the power 
to ban an abortion of a 24-week-old-
fetus because that fetus would not 
have satisfied the viability standard of 
that time, [t]oday . . . that same fetus 
would be considered viable, and 
states would have the power to 
restrict [such] abortions.” How it is 
consistent with a state’s interest in 
protecting unborn children that the 
same fetus would be deserving of 
state protection in one year but 
undeserving of state protection in 
another is not clear. The Supreme 
Court has posited there are “logical 
and biological justifications” for 
choosing viability as the critical 
point. But this choice is better left to 
the states, which might find their 
interest in protecting unborn children 
better served by a more consistent and 
certain marker than viability.…  
 
Another reason for the Court to 
reevaluate its jurisprudence is that the 
facts underlying Roe and Casey may 
have changed.… First, “Roe’s 
assumption that the decision to abort 
a baby will be made in close 
consultation with a woman’s private 
physician is called into question by” 
declarations from women who have 
had abortions. The declaration by Dr. 
John Thorp, a board-certified 
obstetrician and gynecologist, further 
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states that “coercion or pressure prior 
to the termination of pregnancy 
occurs with frequency.” … The 
declarations from women who have 
had abortions also show abortions 
may cause adverse consequences for 
the woman’s health and well-being.  
 
Mike Paulsen has compellingly argued that 
lower-court judges should disregard Supreme 
Court rulings that they in good faith regard as 
unconstitutional and instead leave it to the 
Court “to do its own dirty work” of enforcing 
its lies about the Constitution. The Eighth 
Circuit panel doesn’t take that approach, but 
it does the next best thing. 
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“When Will the Supreme Court Stop Avoiding Abortion?” 
Slate 
Dahlia Lithwick 
June 17, 2015 
On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court 
declined to revive a major abortion provision 
from North Carolina that would have 
required any woman seeking an abortion to 
submit to a mandatory ultrasound while 
doctors or technicians showed the images of 
the scan while describing the fetus in detail, 
whether or not the patient wished to hear or 
see it or the doctor wished to show or say it. 
The law passed in 2011 over the veto of then–
Gov. Bev Perdue. The law contained no 
exception for rape, incest, serious health risks 
to the patient, or cases of severe fetal 
anomalies. 
In refusing to hear the appeal, the court left in 
place the ruling from the U.S. 4th Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which had struck down the 
provision, finding that it violated the First 
Amendment rights of physicians who were 
being “compelled” to speak. That means that, 
at least in the states covered by the 4th Circuit 
(Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and West Virginia), these types of 
forced “display and describe” provisions are 
unconstitutional. They remain permissible in 
other jurisdictions that have upheld these 
types of requirements. Both the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals for the 5th and 8th Circuits have 
upheld similar laws, relying on language 
from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, requiring 
a physician to advise her pre-abortion patient 
of the gestational age of her fetus and provide 
printed information about the risks of 
abortion and other services. Courts that 
upheld the “display and describe” laws 
determined that there was little substantial 
difference between the information provided 
by physicians in Casey and the “display and 
describe” requirements in the new laws. The 
4th Circuit disagreed, finding that the 
requirement had the effect of “transforming 
the physician into the mouthpiece of the 
state,” which “undermines the trust that is 
necessary for facilitating healthy doctor-
patient relationships and, through them, 
successful treatment outcomes.” 
As Jessica Mason Pieklo noted, this 
represents the second time that the Supreme 
Court has refused to hear a mandatory 
ultrasound case. This suggests that while the 
court may not yet be ready to wade into the 
thicket of determining what an “undue 
burden” truly means, the justices continue to 
believe that any speech restriction (or 
compulsion) is a bad thing, full stop. 
With the North Carolina provision fully 
ducked, court-watchers now turn their 
attention to several other abortion regulations 
that are poised to be taken up at the high 
court, perhaps as early as this coming fall. 
Two challenges still loom large: The court is 
currently trying to decide whether to take up 
a case about a Mississippi admitting 
privileges law, struck down by the 5th Circuit, 
that could have the effect of closing down the 
only abortion clinic left in the state. As 
ThinkProgress notes, “When the bill was 
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introduced and passed, politicians in 
Mississippi openly admitted that the law was 
specifically designed to close the last clinic in 
the state.” A question the justices must 
attempt to answer is whether a state can 
completely eliminate women’s ability to 
exercise a constitutional right because they 
can exercise it in other states. In the 
Mississippi appeals court, the judges cited the 
constitutional principle that a state can’t 
violate a citizen’s rights by claiming she can 
go out of state to exercise it elsewhere. 
The court is also looking down the barrel of a 
challenge to two parts of HB2, the famous 
2013 Texas anti-abortion law that required 
providers to obtain admitting privileges to 
local hospitals and that forced clinics to be 
retrofitted to meet surgical center standards. 
Those provisions were upheld by the 5th 
Circuit last week. Under the ruling, all but 
seven Texas abortion providers may be 
forced to shutter—in a state that is home to 
27 million people. The federal appeals court 
made just one exception, for McAllen, Texas, 
where only one clinic serves a significant 
portion of South Texas. The court determined 
that should the clinic in McAllen be forced to 
close, women would have to drive 235 miles 
to obtain an abortion, which would prove a 
substantial obstacle to getting an abortion. 
The 5th Circuit ruling goes into effect on July 
1, unless that court agrees to take another 
look or the Supreme Court intervenes, which 
it did last fall, with an earlier decision about 
the clinic requirements of that same omnibus 
legislation. Back then, the court put a 
temporary hold on the law while the litigation 
played out. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Kagan, and Sotomayor suggested they were 
ready to hear the Texas appeal. 
At this point the “undue burden” test from 
Casey has become something akin to a 
judicial Rorschach test, and even pro-choice 
supporters wary of another trip to the high 
court have become persuaded that absent a 
definitive ruling from the justices, the 
standard will continue to mean whatever the 
reviewing court wants it to mean. The court 
has been dodging reproductive rights cases 
for years now, but as the appeals courts 
continue their judicial multicar pileup, and 
especially if they continue to arrive at 
contradictory results, it begins to look more 
and more likely that the court will simply 
have to weigh in. As Professor Michael Dorf 
told the New York Times last week, the high 
court heard about 20 abortion cases from 
1973 to 1992. They heard only three abortion 
cases in the 23 years since. Dorf suggests that 
the issue has simply been too charged and 
divisive to persuade the justices to jump in. It 
may now be inevitable. 
For opponents of reproductive rights, the 
hope is that Justice Anthony Kennedy is 
finally ready to do what he couldn’t bring 
himself to do in Casey—yank the breathing 
tube out of Roe v. Wade once and for all. For 
supporters of reproductive rights, the 
decision of the court to avoid hearing the 
North Carolina ultrasound case offers a 
filament of comfort: Maybe the court wants 
to wait just a little bit longer. As Robin Marty 
argues here, perhaps the court’s refusal to 
hear the North Carolina ultrasound case 
means the justices are content to sit back a 
little longer and let this whole mess play out 
in the state and lower federal courts. Still the 
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reign of confusion and the patchwork of 
judicial decisions create uncertainty. And the 
fact that Texas is poised to close almost all of 
its remaining clinics in the coming weeks 
creates a new sense of urgency. 
There’s one more consideration. As Pema 
Levy argued last week at Mother Jones, polls 
show that public support for basic access to 
reproductive rights seems to have increased 
somewhat of late: “Last month, Gallup 
reported an upswing in pro-choice sentiment 
in the last year. On the 40th anniversary of 
Roe v. Wade in 2013, a Wall Street 
Journal/NBC News poll found that a record 
70 percent of Americans believed that 
landmark ruling should stand.” That means 
that if the court agrees to take an abortion 
case right at the heart of primary season, it 
could be setting up the issue as a big fat loser 
for the GOP. Far be it from me to suggest that 
the justices take that kind of political calculus 
into account when planning their election-
year dockets, but do the court’s conservatives 
really want to use this fall to force GOP 
candidates to own the worst anti-choice 
stereotypes? The Texas case, in which the 
appeals court judges assumed that women 
have the time and money to drive their 
convertibles hundreds of miles across the 
state to obtain basic reproductive care, 
promises to be the unholy stepchild of Mitt 
Romney’s greatest hits: a place where 
“binders full of women” meets the blithe 
unconcern of the 1 percent.  
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Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell 
Ruling Below: Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. 
Colo. 2013) 
In this case, Catholic religious organizations challenge the regulations implementing the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, specifically the requirement that group 
health care plans provide all women coverage for certain preventative contraception services 
without a co-payment or deductible. 
Question Presented: Whether (a) the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and its implementing 
regulations did not substantially burden plaintiffs' religious exercise or violate plaintiffs' First 
Amendment rights; (b) whether the ACA's accommodation scheme relieved plaintiffs of their 
obligations under the contraception mandate, and did not substantially burden their religious 
exercise under the RFRA; (c) whether plaintiffs failed to make out a plausible claim under the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
 
 
LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR HOME FOR THE AGED, Denver, Colorado, a 
Colorado non-profit corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs – Appellees 
v. 
Sylvia Matthews BURWELL, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, et al., 
Defendants - Appellants 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
 
Filed on July 14, 2015 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
 
MATHESON, Circuit Judge 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passed the Affordable Care 
Act ("ACA") in 2010, it built upon the 
widespread use of employer-based health 
insurance in the United States. The ACA and 
its implementing regulations require 
employers who provide health insurance 
coverage to their employees to include 
coverage for certain types of preventive care 
without cost to the insured. The appeals 
before us concern the regulations that require 
group health plans to cover contraceptive 
services for women as a form of preventive 
care ("Mandate"). 
In response to religious concerns, the 
Departments implementing the ACA—
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), Labor, 
and Treasury—adopted a regulation that 
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exempts religious employers—churches and 
their integrated auxiliaries—from covering 
contraceptives. When religious non-profit 
organizations complained about their 
omission from this exemption, the 
Departments adopted a regulation that allows 
them to opt out of providing, paying for, or 
facilitating contraceptive coverage. Under 
this regulation, a religious non-profit 
organization can opt out by delivering a form 
to their group health plan's health insurance 
issuer or third-party administrator ("TPA") or 
by sending a notification to HHS. 
 
The Plaintiffs in the cases before us are 
religious non-profit organizations. They 
contend that complying with the Mandate or 
the accommodation scheme imposes a 
substantial burden on their religious exercise. 
The Plaintiffs argue the Mandate [12]  and 
the accommodation scheme violate the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
("RFRA") and the Religion and Speech 
Clauses of the First Amendment.  
 
Although we recognize and respect the 
sincerity of Plaintiffs' beliefs and arguments, 
we conclude the accommodation scheme 
relieves Plaintiffs of their obligations under 
the Mandate and does not substantially 
burden their religious exercise under RFRA 
or infringe upon their First Amendment 
rights. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a), we affirm the district 
court's denial of a preliminary injunction to 
the plaintiffs in Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home for the Aged v. Sebelius,  and reverse 
the district courts' grants of a preliminary 
injunction to the plaintiffs in Southern 
Nazarene University v. Sebelius, and 
Reaching Souls International, Inc. v. 
Sebelius. 
 
II. HOBBY LOBBY AND THIS CASE 
 
Last year, the Supreme Court decided 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., in 
which closely-held for-profit corporations 
challenged the Mandate under RFRA. The 
difference between Hobby Lobby and this 
case is significant and frames the issue here. 
In Hobby Lobby, the plaintiff for-profit 
corporations objected on religious grounds to 
providing contraceptive coverage and could 
choose only between (1) complying with the 
ACA by providing the coverage or (2) not 
complying and paying significant penalties. 
In the cases before us, the plaintiff religious 
non-profit organizations can avail themselves 
of an accommodation that allows them to opt 
out of providing contraceptive coverage 
without penalty. Plaintiffs contend the 
process to opt out substantially burdens their 
religious exercise. 
 
In other words, unlike in Hobby Lobby, the 
Plaintiffs do not challenge the general 
obligation under the ACA to provide 
contraceptive coverage. They instead 
challenge the process they must follow to get 
out of complying with that obligation. The 
Plaintiffs do not claim the Departments have 
not tried to accommodate their religious 
concerns. They claim the Departments' 
attempt is inadequate because the acts 
required to opt out of the Mandate 
substantially burden their religious exercise. 
As we discuss more fully below, however, 
the accommodation relieves Plaintiffs of 
their obligation to provide, pay for, or 
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facilitate contraceptive coverage, and does so 
without substantially burdening their 
religious exercise. 
 
III. BACKGROUND 
 
[Section detailing the ACA omitted] 
 
1. Little Sisters of the Poor 
 
The Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the 
Aged, Denver, Colorado and Little Sisters of 
the Poor, Baltimore ("Little Sisters") belong 
to an order of Catholic nuns who devote their 
lives to care for the elderly. The Little Sisters 
provide health insurance coverage to their 
employees through the Christian Brothers 
Employee Benefit Trust ("Trust"), a self-
insured church plan that is not subject to 
ERISA. The Trust uses Christian Brothers 
Services ("Christian Brothers"), another 
Catholic organization, as its TPA. 
 
The Little Sisters have always excluded 
coverage of sterilization, contraception, and 
abortifacients from their health care plan in 
accordance with their religious belief that 
deliberately avoiding reproduction through 
medical means is immoral. The Little Sisters 
"believe that it is wrong for them to 
intentionally facilitate the provision of these 
medical procedures, drugs, devices, and 
related counseling and services." They cite 
"well-established Catholic teaching that 
prohibits encouraging, supporting, or 
partnering with others in the provision of 
sterilization, contraception, and abortion." 
LS Br. at 9-10. The Little Sisters contend they 
"cannot provide these things, take actions 
that directly cause others to provide them, or 
otherwise appear to participate in the 
government's delivery scheme," as the mere 
appearance of condoning these services 
"would violate their public witness to the 
sanctity of human life and human dignity and 
could mislead other Catholics and the 
public."  
 
The Little Sisters are subject to the Mandate 
unless they take advantage of the 
accommodation scheme by delivering the 
Form to the Christian Brothers, their TPA, or 
notifying HHS of their religious objection. If 
they do not take one of these steps and do not 
provide contraceptive coverage, they 
estimate a single Little Sisters home could 
incur penalties of up to $2.5 million per year, 
and allege the Trust could lose up to $130 
million in plan contributions. The Little 
Sisters plaintiffs object that the 
accommodation scheme violates their 
sincerely held religious beliefs because they 
cannot take actions that directly cause others 
to provide contraception or appear to 
participate in the Departments' delivery 
scheme. 
 
* * * * 
 
2. Procedural History 
 
The district courts reached different results in 
the three cases before us, denying a 
preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in 
Little Sisters but granting a preliminary 
injunction to the plaintiffs in Southern 
Nazarene and Reaching Souls. Reviewing the 
reasoning behind their determinations 
clarifies the claims before us on appeal. 
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In Little Sisters, the district court determined 
that complying with the accommodation 
scheme would not impose a substantial 
burden on the Little Sisters' or Christian 
Brothers' religious exercise. The court's 
analysis of the preliminary injunction factors 
began and ended by examining whether the 
plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury if 
the requested relief were denied. After 
determining it was the court's duty to 
determine how the regulations operate as a 
matter of law, the court concluded the 
accommodation scheme does not require the 
Little Sisters to provide contraceptive 
coverage or to participate in the provision of 
contraceptive coverage. 
 
The court noted that the Little Sisters—
unlike the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby—could 
be relieved of the obligation to provide 
coverage by signing and delivering the Form 
to their TPA, the Christian Brothers. The 
court underscored that, while the 
Departments could require the Little Sisters 
to sign and deliver the Form to their TPA to 
avoid the Mandate, the Departments lacked 
enforcement authority under ERISA to levy 
fines or otherwise force the Christian 
Brothers to provide contraceptive coverage 
as the TPA for a self-insured, ERISA-exempt 
church plan. The court concluded that 
requiring the Little Sisters to sign and deliver 
the Form to opt out did not constitute a 
substantial burden on their religious exercise 
and declined to issue a preliminary 
injunction.  
 
The Little Sisters next asked the Tenth 
Circuit for an injunction pending appeal, 
which this court denied. The Supreme Court 
subsequently granted their request for an 
injunction pending appeal, allowing the Little 
Sisters to notify HHS of their religious 
objection instead of sending the Form to their 
TPA as the regulations at the time required. 
The Little Sisters now appeal the district 
court's denial of a preliminary injunction. 
 
IV. UNUSUAL NATURE OF 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
 
Before we present our analysis of the issues, 
we wish to highlight the unusual nature of 
Plaintiffs' central claim, which attacks the 
Government's attempt to accommodate 
religious exercise by providing a means to 
opt out of compliance with a generally 
applicable law. 
 
Most religious liberty claimants allege that a 
generally applicable law or policy without a 
religious exception burdens religious 
exercise, and they ask courts to strike down 
the law or policy or excuse them from 
compliance. Our circuit's three most recent 
RFRA cases fall into this category. In Hobby 
Lobby, the ACA required the plaintiffs to 
provide their employees with health 
insurance coverage of contraceptives against 
their religious beliefs. In Yellowbear v. 
Lampert, a prison policy denied the plaintiff 
access to a sweat lodge, where he wished to 
exercise his Native American religion. In 
Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, a prison policy 
denied the plaintiff a halal diet, which is 
necessary to his Muslim religious exercise. In 
each instance, the law or policy failed to 
provide an exemption or accommodation to 
the plaintiff(s). 
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The Supreme Court's recent ruling in Holt v. 
Hobbs, which concerned a prison ban on 
inmates' growing beards, is another recent 
example of the more common RFRA claim. 
The plaintiff in Holt sought to grow a beard 
in accordance with his Muslim faith. In Holt, 
like in Hobby Lobby, the government 
defendants insisted on a complete restriction 
and did not attempt to accommodate the 
plaintiff's religious exercise. The plaintiff in 
Holt proposed a compromise—he would be 
allowed to grow only a half-inch beard—
which the prison refused. The Court 
ultimately approved this compromise in its 
ruling. 
 
In the cases before us, by contrast, the 
Departments have developed a religious 
accommodation rather than leaving it for the 
courts to fashion judicial relief. Plaintiffs not 
only challenge a law that requires them to 
provide contraceptive coverage against their 
religious beliefs, they challenge the 
exception that the law affords to them. The 
precedents Plaintiffs cite are instructive in 
some respects, but none of them involve a 
situation where the government offers 
religious objectors an accommodation. The 
Supreme Court and this circuit have 
suggested such accommodations might have 
eliminated or lessened burdens we otherwise 
deemed substantial. Until now, however, we 
have not squarely considered a RFRA 
challenge to a religious accommodation. 
 
The closest Tenth Circuit case we have found 
is United States v. Friday, in which defendant 
Winslow Friday argued his conviction for 
shooting a bald eagle without a permit 
violated RFRA because he shot the eagle for 
use in a tribal religious ceremony. The Bald 
and Golden Eagle Protection Act 
forbids killing a bald eagle, but an applicant 
can obtain a permit to "take" a live eagle for 
a religious ceremony. We recognized the 
potential question of "whether it substantially 
burdens Mr. Friday's religion to require him 
to obtain a permit in advance of taking an 
eagle.” We said we were "skeptical that the 
bare requirement of obtaining a permit can be 
regarded as a 'substantial burden' under 
RFRA," but Mr. Friday did not make that 
specific argument, and we decided the permit 
accommodation otherwise met RFRA's strict 
scrutiny element. 
 
We spoke favorably of the government's 
accommodation scheme in Friday, even 
though "[t]hat accommodation may be more 
burdensome than the [religious objectors] 
would prefer, and may sometimes 
subordinate their interests to other policies 
not of their choosing.” As we noted in 
conclusion: "Law accommodates religion; it 
cannot wholly exempt religion from the reach 
of the law. We therefore turn to uncharted 
Tenth Circuit terrain. 
 
* * * * 
 
The Plaintiffs in the three cases before us 
assert claims against the Mandate and 
accommodation scheme under RFRA and the 
First Amendment's Free Exercise, 
Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses. 
Because we determine the accommodation 
scheme relieves Plaintiffs from complying 
with the Mandate and does not substantially 
burden their religious exercise under RFRA 
or infringe upon their First Amendment 
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rights, we affirm the district court's denial of 
a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in 
Little Sisters and reverse the district courts' 
grants of a preliminary injunction to the 
plaintiffs in Southern Nazarene and Reaching 
Souls. 
 
V. RFRA 
 
Under RFRA, the government "shall not 
substantially burden a person's exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability" unless "it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to 
the person—(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest."  
 
Plaintiffs argue the ACA and its 
implementing regulations violate RFRA 
because they substantially burden their 
religious exercise by forcing them to do one 
of three things: (a) comply with the Mandate 
and provide contraceptive coverage, (b) take 
advantage of the accommodation scheme, or 
(c) pay steep fines for non-compliance. We 
conclude that the accommodation scheme 
relieves Plaintiffs of complying with the 
Mandate or paying fines and does not impose 
a substantial burden on Plaintiffs' religious 
exercise for the purposes of RFRA. 
To explain why the accommodation is 
permissible under RFRA, we first review the 
RFRA framework and consider how religious 
accommodations may lessen or eliminate the 
substantiality of a burden on religious 
exercise. We then apply this framework to the 
accommodation scheme before us, which 
exempts religious non-profits from providing 
contraceptive coverage and instead assigns 
that task to health insurance issuers and 
TPAs. 
 
We conclude the accommodation does not 
substantially burden Plaintiffs' religious 
exercise. The accommodation relieves 
Plaintiffs from complying with the Mandate 
and guarantees they will not have to provide, 
pay for, or facilitate contraceptive coverage. 
Plaintiffs do not "trigger" or otherwise cause 
contraceptive coverage because federal law, 
not the act of opting out, entitles plan 
participants and beneficiaries to coverage. 
Although Plaintiffs allege the administrative 
tasks required to opt out of the Mandate make 
them complicit in the overall delivery 
scheme, opting out instead relieves them 
from complicity. Furthermore, these de 
minimis administrative tasks do not 
substantially burden religious exercise for the 
purposes of RFRA. 
 
The dissent parts ways with our majority 
opinion on the self-insured plaintiffs' RFRA 
claims. It stresses that, by opting out, the self-
insured plaintiffs would cause the legal 
responsibility to provide contraceptive 
coverage to shift to their TPAs. We agree. As 
we observe below, the regulations are clear 
on that point. But shifting legal responsibility 
to provide coverage away from the plaintiffs 
relieves rather than burdens their religious 
exercise. The ACA and its implementing 
regulations entitle plan participants and 
beneficiaries to coverage whether or not the 
plaintiffs opt out. And the government has 
established a scheme where, if the law is 
followed, self-insured plaintiffs that opt out 
are relieved of providing, paying for, and 
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facilitating coverage; the government assigns 
that responsibility to their TPAs; and plan 
participants and beneficiaries receive the 
coverage to which they are entitled by federal 
law. Such an arrangement is among the 
common and permissible methods of 
religious accommodation in a pluralist 
society, and does not constitute a substantial 
burden under RFRA. 
 
A. Legal Background 
 
1. Standard of Review 
 
Each appeal before us seeks review of a 
district court order granting or denying a 
preliminary injunction. We review orders 
granting or denying a preliminary injunction 
for abuse of discretion. 
. 
A preliminary injunction may be granted if 
the party seeking it shows: "(1) a likelihood 
of success on the merits; (2) a likely threat 
of [53]  irreparable harm to the movant; (3) 
the harm alleged by the movant outweighs 
any harm to the non-moving party; and (4) an 
injunction is in the public interest." A district 
court abuses its discretion by granting or 
denying a preliminary injunction based on an 
error of law. 
 
2. RFRA and Free Exercise 
 
RFRA was enacted in 1993 in response to 
Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, in which the 
Supreme Court held that burdens on religious 
exercise are constitutional under the Free 
Exercise Clause if they result from a neutral 
law of general application and have a rational 
basis. Congress enacted RFRA to restore the 
pre-Smith standard, which permitted legal 
burdens on an individual's religious exercise 
only if the government could show a 
compelling need to apply the law to that 
person and that the law did so in the least 
restrictive way. Congress specified the 
purpose of RFRA was to restore this 
compelling interest test as it had been 
recognized in Sherbert v. Verner and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
 
By restoring the pre-Smith compelling 
interest standard, Congress did not express 
any intent to alter other aspects of Free 
Exercise jurisprudence. Notably, pre-Smith 
jurisprudence allowed the government "wide 
latitude" to administer large administrative 
programs, and rejected the imposition of 
strict scrutiny in that context. As the Supreme 
Court indicated in Bowen v. Roy, 
 
In the enforcement of a facially 
neutral and uniformly applicable 
requirement for the administration of 
welfare programs reaching many 
millions of people, the Government is 
entitled to wide latitude. The 
Government should not be put to the 
strict test applied by the District 
Court; that standard required the 
Government to justify enforcement of 
the use of Social Security number 
requirement as the least restrictive 
means of accomplishing a compelling 
state interest. 
 
As we discuss at greater length below, the 
pre-Smith standards restored by RFRA 
permitted the Government to impose de 
minimis administrative burdens on religious 
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actors without running afoul of religious 
liberty guarantees. 
 
3. Elements of RFRA Analysis 
 
RFRA analysis follows a burden-shifting 
framework. "[A] plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie claim under RFRA by proving the 
following three elements: (1) a substantial 
burden imposed by the federal government 
on a (2) sincere (3) exercise of religion." The 
burden then shifts to the government to 
demonstrate its law or policy advances "a 
compelling interest implemented through the 
least restrictive means available.” The 
government must show that the "compelling 
interest test is satisfied through application of 
the challenged law 'to the person'—the 
particular claimant whose sincere exercise of 
religion is being substantially burdened." 
"This burden-shifting approach applies even 
at the preliminary injunction stage."  
 
We have previously stated "a government act 
imposes a 'substantial burden' on religious 
exercise if it: (1) requires participation in an 
activity prohibited by a sincerely held 
religious belief, (2) prevents participation in 
conduct motivated by a sincerely held 
religious belief, or (3) places substantial 
pressure on an adherent to engage in conduct 
contrary to a sincerely held religious belief." 
As we discuss in the next section, whether a 
law substantially burdens religious exercise 
in one or more of these ways is a matter for 
courts—not plaintiffs—to decide. 
 
4. Courts Determine Substantial Burden 
 
To determine whether plaintiffs have made a 
prima facie RFRA claim, courts do not 
question "whether the petitioner . . . correctly 
perceived the commands of [his or her] 
faith." But courts do determine whether a 
challenged law or policy substantially 
burdens plaintiffs' religious exercise. RFRA's 
statutory text and religious liberty case law 
demonstrate that courts—not plaintiffs—
must determine if a law or policy 
substantially burdens religious exercise. 
 
RFRA states the federal government "shall 
not substantially burden a person's exercise 
of religion." We must "give effect . . . to every 
clause and word" of a statute when possible. 
Drafts of RFRA prohibited the government 
from placing a "burden" on religious 
exercise. Congress added the word 
"substantially" before passage to clarify that 
only some burdens would violate the act.  
 
We therefore consider not only whether a law 
or policy burdens religious exercise, but 
whether that burden is substantial. If 
plaintiffs could assert and establish that a 
burden is "substantial" without any 
possibility of judicial scrutiny, the word 
"substantial" would become wholly devoid of 
independent meaning. Furthermore, 
accepting any burden alleged by Plaintiffs as 
"substantial" would improperly conflate the 
determination that a religious belief is 
sincerely held with the determination that a 
law or policy substantially burdens religious 
exercise. 
 
Every circuit that has addressed a RFRA 
challenge to the accommodation scheme at 
issue here has concluded that whether the 
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government has imposed a "substantial 
burden" is a legal determination. This 
is consistent with our determination that we 
review de novo "what constitutes [a] 
substantial burden . . . and the ultimate 
determination as to whether the RFRA has 
been violated." Thus, we "accept[] as true the 
factual allegations that [Plaintiffs'] beliefs are 
sincere and of a religious nature—but not the 
legal conclusion, cast as a factual allegation, 
that [their] religious exercise is substantially 
burdened."  
 
We have cautioned that substantiality does 
not permit us to scrutinize the "theological 
merit" of a plaintiff's religious beliefs—
instead, we analyze "the intensity of the 
coercion applied by the government to act 
contrary to those beliefs." Our only task is to 
determine whether the claimant's belief is 
sincere, and if so, whether the government 
has applied substantial pressure on the 
claimant to violate that belief." In 
determining whether a law or policy applies 
substantial pressure on a claimant to violate 
his or her beliefs, we consider how the law or 
policy being challenged actually operates and 
affects religious exercise. When evaluating 
RFRA claims, we have therefore recognized 
that not all burdens alleged by plaintiffs 
amount to substantial burdens. Furthermore, 
as we discuss in the following section, the 
existence of an accommodation may affect 
whether a law or policy burdens 
religious exercise and whether that burden is 
substantial. 
 
5. Accommodations Can Lessen or Eliminate 
Burden 
 
We finally note that accommodations 
function to lessen or eliminate the burden of 
a generally applicable law. In Hobby Lobby, 
this court said the stark choice between 
providing contraceptive coverage and paying 
steep fines constitutes a sufficiently 
substantial burden to warrant relief under 
RFRA. Religious objectors are not always 
put to such a stark choice. When, as here, 
plaintiffs are offered an accommodation to a 
law or policy that would otherwise constitute 
a substantial burden, we must analyze 
whether the accommodation renders the 
potential burden on religious exercise 
insubstantial or nonexistent such that the law 
or policy that includes the accommodation 
satisfies RFRA. 
 
Accommodations may eliminate burdens on 
religious exercise or reduce those burdens to 
de minimis acts of administrative compliance 
that are not substantial for RFRA purposes. 
The Supreme Court recognized this point in 
Hobby Lobby when it suggested an 
accommodation to exempt the plaintiff 
corporations from complying with the 
Mandate could satisfy RFRA concerns.  
The D.C. Circuit observed that "[a] burden 
does not rise to the level of being substantial 
when it places an inconsequential or de 
minimis burden on an adherent's religious 
exercise." Were it otherwise, our substantial 
burden inquiry would become a blunt tool 
incapable of recognizing the meaningful 
difference between forcing organizations to 
provide or pay for contraceptives and 
allowing them to opt out of that requirement. 
To determine whether the accommodation 
scheme in these cases renders the alleged 
burden on Plaintiffs' religious exercise 
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nonexistent or insubstantial, we turn to the 
merits of Plaintiffs' RFRA arguments. 
 
B. Substantial Burden Analysis 
 
1. Plaintiffs' RFRA Arguments 
 
The cases before us turn on whether 
complying with the accommodation 
constitutes a substantial burden. The 
Government does not dispute the sincerity of 
Plaintiffs' religious belief that they may not 
provide, pay for, or facilitate 
contraceptive coverage. The parties dispute 
whether the accommodation scheme 
substantially burdens the Plaintiffs' exercise 
of religion. 
 
Plaintiffs oppose completing the Form or 
notifying HHS because they believe they are 
being asked to play a causal role in the 
delivery of contraceptive coverage and would 
be complicit or perceived to be complicit in 
the overall contraceptive delivery scheme by 
virtue of their opting out. They also allege 
their continuing involvement in the 
regulatory scheme is a substantial burden. 
  
The Government responds that completing 
the Form or notification does not involve 
Plaintiffs in the delivery of contraceptive 
coverage. The accommodation relieves 
Plaintiffs of their obligations under the 
Mandate, and when that occurs, federal law 
authorizes and obligates a health insurance 
issuer or TPA to provide or arrange for the 
delivery of contraceptive coverage to plan 
participants and beneficiaries who are 
entitled to that coverage under the ACA. The 
Government therefore argues the 
accommodation does not substantially 
burden Plaintiffs' religious exercise as a 
matter of law. 
 
2. The Accommodation Scheme Eliminates 
Burdens on Religious Exercise 
 
Under the accommodation scheme, the act of 
opting out relieves objecting religious non-
profit organizations from complying with the 
Mandate and excuses them from participating 
in the provision of contraceptive coverage. 
The Departments designed the 
accommodation so that, upon receipt of the 
Form or a notification from the government, 
health insurance issuers and TPAs—not the 
objecting religious non-profit organization—
provide contraceptive coverage and ensure 
the organization will not be required to 
provide, pay for, or otherwise facilitate that 
coverage. We review this feature of the 
accommodation scheme to show how it 
eliminates burdens Plaintiffs otherwise 
would face, similar to the burdens the for-
profit plaintiffs faced in Hobby Lobby. 
 
First, the regulations specify a health 
insurance issuer must handle contraceptive 
coverage separately from the insurance 
provided under the religious non-profit 
organization's plan. 
 
A group health insurance issuer that receives 
a copy of the self-certification or notification 
. . . must (A) Expressly exclude contraceptive 
coverage from the group health insurance 
coverage provided in connection with the 
group health plan; and (B) Provide separate 
payments for any contraceptive services 
required to be covered under § 
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147.130(a)(1)(iv) for plan participants and 
beneficiaries for so long as they remain 
enrolled in the plan. 
 
Second, after a religious non-profit 
organization opts out, a health insurance 
issuer may not share the costs of providing 
contraception with the employer or 
employees. 
 
With respect to payments for contraceptive 
services, the [health insurance] issuer may 
not impose any cost-sharing requirements 
(such as a copayment, coinsurance, or a 
deductible), or impose any premium, fee, or 
other charge, or any portion thereof, directly 
or indirectly, on the eligible organization, the 
group health plan, or plan participants or 
beneficiaries. The issuer must segregate 
premium revenue collected from the eligible 
organization from the monies used to provide 
payments for contraceptive services. 
TPAs are subject to similar requirements.  
Finally, a health insurance issuer or TPA 
must, in communicating with plan 
participants or beneficiaries, send separate 
notice regarding contraceptive coverage from 
other plan notifications and make clear the 
employer neither administers nor funds 
contraceptive benefits. A health insurance 
issuer or TPA: 
 
must provide to plan participants and 
beneficiaries written notice of the 
availability of separate payments for 
contraceptive services 
contemporaneous with (to the extent 
possible), but separate from, any 
application materials distributed in 
connection with enrollment (or re-
enrollment) in group health coverage 
that is effective beginning on the first 
day of each applicable plan year. The 
notice must specify that the eligible 
organization does 
not [68]  administer or fund 
contraceptive benefits, but that the 
third party administrator or issuer, as 
applicable, provides separate 
payments for contraceptive services, 
and must provide contact information 
for questions and complaints. 
 
All of the foregoing removes the objecting 
religious non-profit organizations from 
providing contraceptive coverage, but 
Plaintiffs argue these protections of their 
religious liberty are insufficient because they 
still must deliver a Form or notify HHS to opt 
out of the Mandate. They contend this act 
substantially burdens their religious exercise 
because it "triggers" the provision of 
contraceptive coverage, makes them 
complicit in the larger delivery scheme, and 
demands their ongoing involvement. We 
disagree. The accommodation relieves 
Plaintiffs of their statutory obligation to 
provide contraceptive coverage to their plan 
participants and beneficiaries, and as we 
discuss below, taking advantage of that 
accommodation is not a substantial burden on 
religious exercise. 
 
3. The Accommodation Scheme Does Not 
Impose a Substantial Burden 
 
To explain why the accommodation scheme 
does not substantially burden Plaintiffs' 
religious exercise, we look at the theories 
argued by the Plaintiffs and why they fail. 
 
a. Opting out does not cause contraceptive 
coverage. 
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Although the accommodation scheme frees 
Plaintiffs from providing, paying for, or 
facilitating contraceptive coverage, they 
contend that, by delivering the Form or 
notifying HHS, they nevertheless "trigger" or 
cause contraceptive coverage. They do not. 
As we explain below, Plaintiffs' causation 
argument misconstrues the statutory and 
regulatory framework. Federal law, not the 
Form or notification to HHS, provides for 
contraceptive coverage without cost sharing 
to plan participants and beneficiaries. 
Because the mechanics of the 
accommodation scheme differ slightly for 
different types of plans, we examine how the 
regulations work for insured plans, self-
insured plans, and self-insured church plans. 
But in each circumstance, Plaintiffs' 
causation argument fails to establish any 
burden on Plaintiffs' religious exercise. 
 
i. Insured Plans 
 
The plaintiffs with insured plans deal directly 
with a health insurance issuer and do not use 
a TPA. They argue the accommodation 
scheme levies a substantial burden on their 
religious exercise because "insurance issuers 
will sell [them] plans that either  (a) 
expressly include abortifacients; or (b) 
functionally include abortifacients by 
guaranteeing separate payments for them 
upon [their] execution and conveyance of the 
self-certification to the issuer." We disagree. 
 
The regulations do not burden the religious 
exercise of employers using insured plans. 
The ACA obligates both group health plans 
and health insurance issuers to provide 
contraceptive coverage. A religious non-
profit organization may comply with the 
Mandate and provide coverage to its 
employees, opt out using the 
accommodation, or not comply with the law 
and pay fines. But in each instance, the health 
insurance issuer must ensure the 
organization's employees receive 
contraceptive coverage. 
 
By delivering the Form or notifying HHS, an 
organization with an insured plan does not 
enable coverage—to the contrary, it simply 
notifies its health insurance issuer the 
organization will not be providing coverage. 
The health insurance issuer then has an 
independent and exclusive obligation 
to provide that coverage without cost sharing. 
The relevant regulation states: "When a self-
certification is provided directly to an issuer, 
the issuer has sole responsibility for 
providing such coverage in accordance with 
§ 147.130." Because the ACA obligates 
health insurance issuers to provide 
contraceptive coverage, they must meet this 
obligation independently and irrespective of 
the notification. The self-certification does 
not impose any responsibility; it merely 
makes it the issuer's sole responsibility rather 
than one shared with the group health plan 
itself. 
 
Because federal law requires the health 
insurance issuer to provide coverage and the 
accommodation process removes an 
objecting organization from participating, 
plaintiffs with insured plans fail to show the 
accommodation burdens their religious 
exercise. The insured plaintiffs are not 
burdened when they are relieved of their 
responsibility and their insurers provide 
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coverage as required by independent 
obligations set out in the ACA. 
 
ii. Self-Insured Plans 
 
The accommodation scheme permits 
religious non-profit organizations with self-
insured plans to opt out by delivering the 
Form to their TPA or notifying HHS that they 
have a religious objection and will not 
comply with the Mandate. When the 
objecting organization opts out, the TPA that 
administers its group health plan is 
responsible for providing contraceptive 
coverage if it wishes to remain a TPA for the 
plan. In this section, we address this self-
insured arrangement. In the next section, we 
consider the subset of self-insured plaintiffs 
having church plans over which the 
government lacks enforcement authority 
under ERISA to compel the TPA to comply 
with its legal obligations. 
 
1) Plaintiffs' argument 
 
The only plaintiff with a self-insured plan 
subject to ERISA is Southern Nazarene. 
Southern Nazarene argues the 
accommodation scheme substantially 
burdens its religious exercise because the 
scheme requires it to "comply with the 
Mandate by either (a) setting up a self-
insured plan that includes abortifacients; or 
(b) setting up a self-insured plan that 
functionally includes abortifacients by 
guaranteeing separate payments for them by 
the TPA upon the entity's execution of the 
self-certification.” Self-insured plaintiffs 
with ERISA-exempt church plans make 
similar claims. 
 
Plaintiffs and the dissent emphasize that the 
TPA may arrange or provide coverage 
only after a religious non-profit organization 
opts out. We consider this to be an 
uncontested and unremarkable feature of the 
accommodation scheme. The regulations 
state that when a religious non-profit 
organization opts out of providing 
contraceptive coverage, the TPA is notified 
that the organization will not administer or 
pay for contraceptive coverage, and that it 
must provide or arrange for contraceptive 
coverage without cost sharing if it wishes to 
continue administering the plan. The TPA is 
authorized and obligated to provide the 
coverage guaranteed by the ACA only if the 
religious non-profit organization that has 
primary responsibility for contraceptive 
coverage opts out of providing it. 
 
Plaintiffs suggest this shift in legal 
responsibility for contraceptive coverage 
substantially burdens their religious exercise 
under RFRA. They argue their opting out 
would trigger, cause, or offer a "permission 
slip" for the delivery of contraception by 
allowing their TPA to provide the coverage. 
We disagree. 
 
2) Opting out does not cause coverage 
 
The ACA requires all group health plans to 
cover preventive services, including 
contraception, without cost sharing. Because 
a group health plan must include 
contraceptive coverage under the ACA, the 
accommodation scheme requires a TPA that 
administers a self-insured religious non-
profit organization's group health plan to 
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provide coverage if the organization opts out. 
The TPA must then arrange coverage for plan 
participants and beneficiaries if it wishes to 
continue functioning as the TPA for the 
objecting organization. This arrangement 
allows religious non-profit organizations to 
opt out and ensures plan participants and 
beneficiaries will receive the contraceptive 
coverage to which they are entitled by law. 
 
Under this framework, the plaintiffs' 
argument does not identify a substantial 
burden on religious exercise. The opt out 
does not "cause" contraceptive coverage; it 
relieves objectors of their coverage 
responsibility, at which point federal law 
shifts that responsibility to a different actor. 
The ACA and its implementing regulations 
have already required that group health plans 
will include contraceptive coverage and have 
assigned legal responsibilities to ensure such 
coverage will be provided when the religious 
non-profit organization opts out.  
 
This arrangement is typical of religious 
objection accommodations that shift 
responsibility to non-objecting entities only 
after an objector declines to perform a task on 
religious grounds. Although a religious non-
profit organization may opt out from 
providing contraceptive coverage, it cannot 
preclude the government from requiring 
others to provide the legally required 
coverage in its stead. In short, the framework 
established by federal law, not the actions of 
the religious objector, ensures that plan 
participants and beneficiaries will receive 
contraceptive coverage.  
 
3) Response to dissent 
 
The dissent argues that our reasoning fails to 
appreciate the difference between insured 
and self-insured plans. With insured plans, 
the health insurance issuer bears legal 
responsibility to provide contraceptive 
coverage whether or not the religious non-
profit has opted out. With self-insured 
plans, the TPA shoulders legal responsibility 
for coverage only after the religious non-
profit has opted out. 
 
We agree this is a distinction between these 
types of plans, but the dissent overplays its 
importance. In both contexts, the ACA 
requires that group health plans cover 
contraceptive services, and a plaintiff knows 
coverage will be provided when it opts out. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute plan participants and 
beneficiaries' right to contraceptive coverage, 
nor do they contest the government's ability 
to require TPAs and health insurance issuers 
to arrange for such coverage when a religious 
non-profit organization opts out. The only 
question before us is whether the plaintiffs 
are substantially burdened when they notify 
the government of their objection with the 
knowledge that another party will be required 
to provide coverage in their stead. The 
answer is no. 
 
A religious accommodation tries to reconcile 
religious liberty with the rule of law. When 
faced with an unavoidable conflict between 
following the law or religious belief, RFRA 
provides a religious objector a means to 
challenge a generally applicable law and seek 
an exception to avoid following that law 
without having to break it. A statutory 
accommodation, as we have here, serves the 
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same purpose. As noted above, this case is 
unusual because the Plaintiffs do not seek an 
accommodation where none exists, but 
instead challenge a statutory accommodation 
and argue that the process for seeking refuge 
in it substantially burdens their religious 
exercise. As to the self-insured plaintiffs, the 
dissent contends that if they opt out and 
transfer their duty to provide contraceptive 
coverage to the TPA, they necessarily cause 
such coverage. We disagree. 
 
By opting out, the self-insured plaintiffs shift 
their duty to provide coverage to a TPA, but 
they do not change their plan participants and 
beneficiaries' entitlement to contraceptive 
coverage under federal law. The dissent 
suggests, however, that because the plaintiffs 
can stymie coverage to their employees by 
breaking the law and incurring fines, and 
because opting out ultimately results in the 
TPAs' providing coverage, the plaintiffs' 
opting out therefore would cause 
contraceptive coverage. But this 
misconstrues the purpose of religious 
accommodation: to permit the religious 
objector both to avoid a religious burden and 
to comply with the law. If the plaintiffs wish 
to avail themselves of a legal means—an 
accommodation—to be excused from 
compliance with a law, they cannot rely on 
the possibility of their violating that very 
same law to challenge the accommodation. In 
making this argument, the dissent focuses 
almost exclusively on whether the plaintiffs' 
opt out is a but-for cause of the TPAs' 
authority to provide contraceptive coverage. 
It does, but this approach misses the mark. 
Although opting out is necessarily a but-for 
cause of someone else—the TPA—providing 
contraceptive coverage, that is the point of an 
accommodation—shifting a responsibility 
from an objector to a non-objector. That is 
how a legislative policy choice—here, to 
afford women contraceptive coverage—can 
be reconciled with religious objections to that 
policy. We do not "den[y] the existence of 
any causation." We instead correctly identify 
the effect of opting out. The effect is to shift 
legal responsibility from the self-insured 
plaintiff to its TPA and relieve the plaintiff of 
the duty it considers objectionable. The effect 
is not the provision of contraceptive 
coverage, which would be afforded under the 
law whether or not the plaintiff opts out. 
The ACA requires that either the religious 
non-profit organization or the TPA must 
provide contraceptive coverage for a self-
insured group health plan, and the 
accommodation must be evaluated with that 
provision in mind. The scheme allows the 
religious non-profit organization to opt out of 
the responsibility of providing coverage and 
assigns that duty to the TPA administering 
the group health plan. Crucially, it does not 
change or expand contraceptive coverage 
beyond what federal law has already 
guaranteed. As the Supreme Court said in 
Hobby Lobby, the effect of the 
accommodation on employees "would be 
precisely zero. Under that accommodation, 
these women would still be entitled to all 
FDA-approved contraceptives without cost 
sharing."  
 
The government has designed the 
accommodation so plaintiffs that opt out are 
freed from providing, paying for, or 
facilitating contraception, and the TPA's 
responsibility to provide coverage in their 
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stead stems from federal law. Because this 
arrangement does not substantially burden 
the plaintiffs when they comply with the law, 
it does not matter whether the plaintiffs could 
prevent plan participants and beneficiaries 
from receiving coverage by violating the law. 
The dissent seems to suggest the ACA and its 
implementing regulations give self-insured 
plaintiffs discretion to decide whether their 
employees receive contraceptive coverage. 
The ACA and its implementing regulations 
do not, and the plaintiffs do not contend that 
they do. To the contrary, federal law 
generally requires that all people must have 
health insurance and that all health insurance 
must include preventive services, including 
contraceptive coverage.  
 
And "although [the ACA] does not 
specifically mention third-party 
administrators, they administer 'group health 
plans,' which must include coverage. Nothing 
suggests the insurers' or third-party 
administrators' obligations would be waived 
if the plaintiffs refused to apply for the 
accommodation." The accommodation 
scheme does not give plaintiffs discretion to 
thwart their employees' right to contraceptive 
coverage by refusing to provide coverage and 
also refusing to register their objection so the 
government can make alternative 
arrangements to free them from providing 
coverage. Because Congress has created a 
federal entitlement to contraceptive coverage 
and formulated a framework to guarantee that 
coverage will be provided even if plaintiffs 
decline to provide it, self-insured plaintiffs do 
not "cause" contraceptive coverage by 
exercising their ability to opt out. 
 
4) No cause of substantial burden 
 
In sum, the self-insured plaintiffs' causal 
analysis falters regarding the effect of opting 
out, which is to shift legal responsibility to 
provide contraceptive coverage from 
plaintiffs to their TPAs. When the 
government establishes a scheme that 
anticipates religious concerns by allowing 
objectors to opt out but ensuring that others 
will take up their responsibilities, plaintiffs 
are not substantially burdened merely 
because their decision to opt out cannot 
prevent the responsibility from being met. 
 
To establish a claim under RFRA, about 
which the dissent says little, a plaintiff must 
show the government substantially burdens 
its sincere religious exercise. The ACA states 
group health plans must cover contraception, 
and the regulations state that if a religious 
non-profit organization opts out, that 
coverage will be provided by a TPA. Opting 
out does not cause the coverage itself; federal 
law does, by establishing a scheme that 
permits plaintiffs to opt out of their legal 
responsibility while simultaneously ensuring 
that plan participants and beneficiaries 
receive the coverage to which they are legally 
entitled. Allowing plaintiffs to opt out is not 
a substantial burden under RFRA. 
 
iii. Self-Insured Church Plans 
 
The foregoing analysis of self-insured plans 
applies to the subset of self-insured church 
plans. We address additional reasons here to 
reject the church plan plaintiffs' RFRA 
claims. 
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The plaintiffs with self-insured church plans 
are in a unique position. A TPA cannot be 
compelled to provide or arrange for 
contraceptive coverage if it administers a 
church plan under 26 U.S.C. § 414(e) that has 
not elected to comply with provisions of 
ERISA under 26 U.S.C. § 410(d)—which 
describes the self-insured church plans in the 
cases before us. The Departments concede 
they lack authority under ERISA to force 
these church plan TPAs to perform their 
regulatory responsibility. As a result, the 
Government can require the plaintiffs with 
self-insured church plans to use the Form or 
notify HHS to register their objection and opt 
out, but it has no enforcement authority to 
compel or penalize those plaintiffs' TPAs if 
they decline to provide or arrange for 
contraceptive coverage. 
  
The lack of enforcement authority makes any 
burden on plaintiffs with church plans even 
less substantial than the burden on plaintiffs 
with self-insured plans that are subject to 
ERISA. Nonetheless, plaintiffs with church 
plans offer the following arguments as to why 
the accommodation scheme might still 
burden their religious exercise. First, the 
Departments could decide to alter the 
regulations and assert authority over church 
plans under ERISA. Second, the mere act of 
signing the Form or delivering the 
notification may involve them in the 
provision of contraception, either by 
cooperating with the Departments or by 
providing authorization to a TPA, which then 
decides it wants to provide contraceptive 
coverage after all. Third, their opting out 
incentivizes TPAs to provide coverage even 
if they are exempt from ERISA. Fourth, the 
Government has not demonstrated why the 
plaintiffs must complete the self-certification 
if their TPAs can decline to provide 
contraceptive coverage. In addition to the 
reasons self-insured plans in general are not 
substantially burdened by the 
accommodation scheme, we conclude the 
plaintiffs with self-insured church plans have 
failed to identify a substantial burden on 
religious exercise. 
 
1) Hypothetical regulation 
 
The plaintiffs argue the Departments could 
assert authority over church plans under 
ERISA at some point in the future. We assess 
the regulations as they currently exist, not 
amendments to ERISA's implementing 
regulations the Department of Labor may 
hypothetically promulgate. An "[i]njunction 
issues to prevent existing or presently 
threatened injuries. One will not be granted 
against something merely feared as liable to 
occur at some indefinite time in the future." 
Should the Departments assert ERISA 
authority over church plans at some later 
date, plaintiffs may then seek a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the Departments from 
enforcing the Mandate. Unless and until the 
Departments change their position, however, 
plaintiffs' speculative argument does not 
warrant a preliminary injunction. 
 
2) No causation from church plan TPA 
notification 
 
The plaintiffs contend completing the self-
certification would be a substantial burden 
because it would allow TPAs to provide 
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coverage to their group health plan 
participants and beneficiaries, even if the 
Departments cannot compel the TPA to do so 
under ERISA. But plaintiffs with self-insured 
church plans are not substantially burdened 
by the requirement that they complete the 
Form or notification to HHS. As we 
explained in the previous section on self-
insured plans, when a religious non-profit 
organization opts out of the Mandate, the 
requirement that the group health plan 
include contraceptive coverage is a product 
of federal law, not the product of the 
organization's opting out. Opting out frees 
plaintiffs from their obligation to provide 
contraceptive coverage under the ACA. The 
lack of substantial burden is especially 
evident when the group health plan is 
administered by a TPA that has made clear it 
will not provide contraceptive coverage on 
religious grounds. The Little Sisters' TPA, for 
example, is Christian Brothers, their co-
plaintiff in this case. It is clear Christian 
Brothers need not, and will not, provide 
contraceptive coverage if the Little Sisters 
opt out of the Mandate.  
 
3) No incentive from church plan TPA 
notification 
 
Even when TPAs for self-insured church 
plans indicate they may comply with the 
Mandate, the TPAs make that decision, and 
the objecting religious non-profit 
organization is not substantially burdened. 
The plaintiffs in Reaching Souls argue one of 
their TPAs, Highmark, has indicated it will 
provide contraceptive coverage if they opt 
out of the Mandate. The Reaching Souls 
plaintiffs argue their act of opting out would 
not only provide Highmark with permission 
to provide contraceptive coverage, but would 
incentivize it to do so because Highmark 
could then seek reimbursement from the 
government. 
 
Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate the 
reimbursement provision actually gives 
TPAs an incentive to provide coverage. They 
claim a TPA that receives the Form or a letter 
from the government "becomes eligible for 
government payments that will both cover 
the TPA's costs and include an additional 
payment (equal to at least 10% of costs) for 
the TPA's margin and overhead."  
 
At a hearing in Reaching Souls, counsel for 
the Government seemed to accept this 
characterization. But the regulations 
themselves expressly contradict this reading. 
They state the payment for margin and 
overhead goes to health insurance issuers 
who act as intermediaries for the 
reimbursement, and need not go to TPAs 
 
Moreover, even if TPAs were to receive a 
payment for margin and overhead—set at 
15% of costs for 2014—plaintiffs do not 
demonstrate this allowance actually 
functions as an incentive to provide 
contraceptive coverage rather than 
repayment for the administrative costs TPAs 
incur by stepping in to arrange for or provide 
coverage. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated 
the allowance for administrative overhead 
actually generates a profit for TPAs, nor have 
they demonstrated that the allowance would 
incentivize TPAs to provide coverage where 
they otherwise would not. 
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4) The Government may require affirmative 
objection 
 
Plaintiffs finally argue that if the 
Departments lack ERISA enforcement 
authority against TPAs of self-insured church 
plans, the Government has no reason to 
require religious non-profit organizations to 
comply with the accommodation scheme and 
deliver the Form or notify HHS. It is the 
plaintiffs' burden, however, to state a prima 
facie case under RFRA. Because they cannot 
establish that signing the Form or notifying 
HHS constitutes a substantial burden on their 
religious exercise, we do not question the 
Departments' interest in requiring them to opt 
out of the Mandate to avoid penalties for 
failure to provide contraceptive coverage. 
  
* * * * 
 
We conclude the Plaintiffs' causation 
arguments do not establish a burden on their 
religious exercise, much less a substantial 
burden, because opting out would not trigger, 
incentivize, or otherwise cause the provision 
of contraceptive coverage. We therefore turn 
to Plaintiffs' argument that the act of opting 
out and the administrative requirements 
associated with the accommodation make 
them feel or appear complicit in the overall 
contraceptive coverage scheme. 
 
e. No substantial burden from complicity 
 
The accommodation relieves Plaintiffs from 
providing, paying for, or facilitating 
contraceptive coverage and federal law 
requires health insurance issuers and TPAs to 
provide contraceptive coverage when 
religious non-profit organizations take 
advantage of the accommodation. Plaintiffs 
argue the act of opting out would 
nevertheless substantially burden their 
religious exercise because they believe 
delivering the Form or notification to HHS 
would make them complicit in the overall 
scheme to deliver contraceptive coverage. 
They wish to play no part in it. We find this 
argument unconvincing for a number of 
reasons. 
 
First, the purpose and design of the 
accommodation scheme is to ensure that 
Plaintiffs are not complicit—that they do not 
have to provide, pay for, or facilitate 
contraception. Plaintiffs' concern that others 
may believe they condone the Mandate is 
unfounded. Opting out sends the 
unambiguous message that they oppose 
contraceptive coverage and refuse to provide 
it, and does not foreclose them from 
objecting both to contraception and the 
Mandate in the strongest possible terms. 
 
Second, to the extent Plaintiffs assert that 
completing the Form or notification violates 
their religious beliefs, they state a necessary 
but not a sufficient predicate for a RFRA 
claim. Under RFRA, they must establish that 
completing the Form or notification 
substantially burdens their religious exercise; 
otherwise, this argument could be used to 
avoid almost any legal obligation that 
involves a form. Plaintiffs do not object to 
signing forms and paperwork generally—
they object to the Form or notification to 
HHS, and they do so because they believe it 
involves them in directly or indirectly 
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providing, paying for, or facilitating 
contraceptive coverage, which they oppose 
as a matter of religious conviction. As we 
have explained, the Plaintiffs misstate their 
role in the accommodation scheme. RFRA 
does not require us to defer to their erroneous 
view about the operation of the ACA and its 
implementing regulations. 
  
Third, because the accommodation does not 
involve them in providing, paying for, 
facilitating, or causing contraceptive 
coverage, Plaintiffs' only involvement in the 
scheme is the act of opting out. Plaintiffs are 
not substantially burdened solely by the de 
minimis administrative tasks this involves. 
All opt-out schemes require some affirmative 
act to free objectors from the obligations they 
would otherwise face. The Plaintiffs' logic 
would undermine conscientious objection 
schemes that require the objection to be 
made, relieve objectors of their obligations, 
but assign those obligations to other, non-
objecting actors in their stead.  
 
Having to file paperwork or otherwise 
register a religious objection, even if one 
disagrees with the ultimate aim of the law at 
issue, does not alone substantially burden 
religious exercise. 
 
The Government may therefore require 
religious objectors to complete de minimis 
administrative tasks to opt out. Filing the 
Form or notifying HHS easily fits within this 
category. The Departments have made opting 
out of the Mandate at least as easy as 
obtaining a parade permit, filing a simple tax 
form, or registering to vote—in other words, 
a routine, brief administrative task. The 
purpose of the Form or notification to HHS is 
to extricate Plaintiffs from their legal 
obligation to provide contraceptive coverage. 
Opting out ensures they will play no part in 
the provision of contraceptive coverage, 
prohibits TPAs and health insurance issuers 
from sharing the costs of providing coverage 
with them, and requires notice to employees 
that they do not administer or fund 
contraceptive services. 
 
The notification to HHS is especially 
minimal, as it requires Plaintiffs only to 
register their objection with HHS and does 
not require any contact with their health 
insurance issuers or TPAs. Although 
Plaintiffs must tell HHS which health 
insurance issuer or TPA they use to opt out of 
the Mandate, this is not a substantial burden 
on religious exercise. 
 
 It is the kind of administrative task the 
Departments can require of religious 
believers in the administration of 
governmental programs. When understood in 
light of the ACA's requirement that group 
health plans and health insurance issuers 
provide contraceptive coverage and the 
manner in which the accommodation relieves 
Plaintiffs of providing that coverage, 
identifying one's TPA in a letter to HHS is at 
most a minimal burden and certainly not a 
substantial one. 
 
Finally, Plaintiffs are not substantially 
burdened when, after they opt out and are 
relieved of their obligations under the 
Mandate, health insurance issuers or TPAs 
must provide contraception to plan 
participants and beneficiaries. Plaintiffs 
sincerely oppose contraception, but their 
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religious objection cannot hamstring 
government efforts to ensure that plan 
participants and beneficiaries receive the 
coverage to which they are entitled under the 
ACA. "Religious objectors do not suffer 
substantial burdens under RFRA where the 
only harm to them is that they sincerely feel 
aggrieved by their inability to prevent what 
other people would do to fulfill regulatory 
objectives after they opt out." Pre-Smith case 
law and RFRA's legislative history 
underscore that religious exercise is not 
substantially burdened merely because the 
Government spends its money or arranges its 
own affairs in ways that plaintiffs find 
objectionable. RFRA does not prevent the 
Government from reassigning obligations 
after an objector opts out simply because the 
objector strongly opposes the ultimate goal of 
the generally applicable law. 
 
Plaintiffs' complicity argument therefore 
fails. Opting out would eliminate their 
complicity with the Mandate and require only 
routine and minimal administrative 
paperwork, and they are not substantially 
burdened by the Government's subsequent 
efforts to deliver contraceptive coverage in 
their stead. 
 
f. No burden from ongoing requirements 
 
As a final argument, Plaintiffs deny the act of 
opting out would free them from further 
involvement in the provision of contraceptive 
coverage. They argue the accommodation 
scheme would require their ongoing 
participation, and give two examples to 
support this claim. 
 
First, Plaintiffs argue they would remain 
involved because the Departments are 
commandeering their group health plans to 
provide contraceptive coverage to their 
employees. They note their TPA or health 
insurance issuer can provide coverage only as 
long as plan participants and beneficiaries 
remain employed with the religious non-
profit organization. 
 
Plaintiffs have not shown, assuming they opt 
out, how the provision of coverage to plan 
participants and beneficiaries through the 
health insurance issuer or TPA would 
substantially burden their religious exercise. 
Plaintiffs' plan participants and beneficiaries 
are not guaranteed contraceptive coverage 
without cost sharing because they work for 
the Plaintiffs; they are guaranteed 
contraceptive coverage under the ACA. The 
ACA mandates health insurance that includes 
contraceptive coverage. Plaintiffs' theory 
would not only relieve them of complying 
with the Mandate, it would prevent health 
insurance issuers and TPAs from stepping in 
under the ACA to provide plan participants 
and beneficiaries with the coverage they are 
entitled to receive under federal law. 
 
Second, Plaintiffs object that they must (a) 
notify their TPA or health insurance issuer 
when employees join or leave their broader 
health insurance scheme, and (b) complete 
the self-certification or notification to HHS 
when they create or terminate a relationship 
with a TPA or health insurance issuer. As to 
the first requirement, employers already must 
notify their TPA or health insurance issuer 
when they hire or fire employees. The 
communication with the TPA or health 
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insurance issuer regarding general health 
insurance coverage for entering or exiting 
plan participants and beneficiaries would 
occur regardless of any legal obligation under 
the accommodation scheme. The latter 
requirement, however, is an obligation 
specific to the accommodation scheme. An 
insured or self-insured employer using the 
Form must send it to "each" TPA or health 
insurance issuer as the employer forms 
contractual relationships with them. If the 
employer instead uses the notification 
process, the regulations state: "If there is a 
change in any of the information required to 
be included in the notice, the organization 
must provide updated information to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services."  
 
Once again, this does not constitute a 
substantial burden. The only new 
requirement is that employers must complete 
the Form or notify HHS of their objection 
when they contract with a new health 
insurance issuer or TPA. Plaintiffs do not 
argue the time, cost, or energy required to 
comply with this requirement constitutes a 
substantial burden; they argue it is the moral 
significance of their involvement which 
burdens their religious exercise. 
 
 If the first self-certification is not a 
substantial burden, a second or third self-
certification would not be substantially 
burdensome given the extremely minimal 
administrative requirements of the Form or 
notification. As we have discussed above, de 
minimis administrative requirements do not 
themselves amount to substantial burdens on 
religious liberty. If the actual delivery of the 
Form or notification is not a substantial 
burden, a contingent administrative 
requirement to update the Form or 
notification is not either. 
The regulations require the Plaintiffs to 
complete the Form or deliver the notification 
if they wish to opt out. But this ministerial act 
to opt out is not a substantial burden on 
religious exercise, nor are the collateral 
requirements of the scheme. The 
Departments have allowed Plaintiffs to opt 
out of a neutral and generally applicable 
requirement imposed by federal law, and 
have done so in a manner that affirmatively 
distances those organizations from the 
provision of contraceptive coverage that 
other employers must provide. It is not a 
substantial burden to require organizations to 
provide minimal information for 
administrative purposes to take advantage of 
that accommodation. 
 
C. Strict Scrutiny 
 
Because we determine Plaintiffs have failed 
to demonstrate a substantial burden on their 
religious exercise, we need not address 
whether the Departments have shown a 
compelling state interest and adopted the 
least restrictive means of advancing that 
interest  
 
D. Conclusion 
 
In the absence of a substantial burden, 
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a strong 
likelihood of success on the merits of their 
RFRA claim, nor have they demonstrated 
they will suffer irreparable injury if an 
injunction is denied. Accordingly, a 
preliminary injunction on RFRA grounds is 
inappropriate. 
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VI. FIRST AMENDMENT 
Although the district courts focused almost 
exclusively on RFRA, Plaintiffs also raised 
constitutional claims. They argue the 
accommodation scheme violates the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the 
First Amendment by exempting 
religious employers from the Mandate but 
requiring religious non-profit organizations 
to seek an accommodation. Plaintiffs also 
argue the accommodation scheme 
simultaneously compels and silences their 
speech in violation of the Free Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment. We disagree and 
conclude the accommodation scheme 
comports with the First Amendment. We note 
that the same standard of review we 
identified for the RFRA claim applies to the 
First Amendment claims. 
 
A. Free Exercise Clause 
 
Plaintiffs contend the ACA and its 
implementing regulations violate the Free 
Exercise Clause by exempting some religious 
objectors—churches and their "integrated 
auxiliaries"—from the Mandate, while 
requiring others—specifically, religious non-
profit organizations—to comply with the 
Mandate, seek an accommodation, or pay 
substantial fines. They have not explained 
how their Free Exercise claim differs from 
their Establishment Clause claim, nor do they 
explain how they could prevail under the 
standard in Smith if they are unlikely to 
succeed under RFRA. Because we conclude 
the Mandate and accommodation scheme are 
neutral and generally applicable laws, they 
are subject only to rational basis review, 
which they survive. 
 
1. Legal Background 
 
The First Amendment's religion clauses state: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof." To resolve challenges 
under the Free Exercise Clause, we use a 
well-established framework. If a law is 
neutral and generally applicable, it does not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause "even if the 
law has the incidental effect of burdening a 
particular religious practice." "A law is 
neutral so long as its object is something 
other than the infringement or restriction of 
religious practices." A law that is facially 
neutral may nevertheless fail the neutrality 
test if it covertly targets religious conduct for 
adverse treatment.  
 
To determine whether a law is generally 
applicable, we ask if the "legislature 
decide[d] that the governmental interests it 
seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued 
only against conduct with a religious 
motivation." "[A] law that is both neutral and 
generally applicable need only be rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest 
to survive a constitutional challenge." 
 
2. The Mandate and Accommodation 
Scheme are Neutral 
 
The Mandate and the accommodation 
scheme are neutral laws. The Mandate is 
facially neutral with regard to employers, and 
neither the history nor the text of the ACA 
and its implementing regulations suggest the 
Mandate was targeted at a particular religion 
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or religious practice. Plaintiffs cannot show 
Congress or HHS "had as their object the 
suppression of religion." To the contrary, the 
Mandate arose from concerns about the 
personal and social costs of barriers 
preventing women from receiving preventive 
care, including reproductive health care. 
 
The accommodation scheme was developed 
to facilitate the free exercise of religion, not 
to target religious groups or burden religious 
practice. To that end, the Departments 
expanded the religious employer exemption 
and religious non-profit organization 
accommodation to respond to the concerns of 
religious groups. The Plaintiffs' apparent 
dissatisfaction with the accommodation 
offered to them does not mean the Mandate 
or the accommodation scheme is non-neutral. 
 
3. The Mandate and Accommodation 
Scheme are Generally Applicable 
 
The Mandate and the accommodation 
scheme are also generally applicable. 
Plaintiffs cannot show Congress or the 
Departments sought to impose the Mandate 
only against religious groups; to the contrary, 
the Mandate applies to all employers with 
more than fifty employees using non-
grandfathered health plans. "The exemptions 
do not render the law so under-inclusive as to 
belie the government's interest in protecting 
public health and promoting women's well-
being or to suggest that disfavoring Catholic 
or other pro-life employers was its objective. 
Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate the 
accommodation scheme targets religious 
conduct or was created with the objective of 
disfavoring particular faiths. To the contrary, 
the Mandate was enacted as part of a larger 
program of health care reform, and both the 
exemption for religious employers and the 
accommodation for religious non-profit 
organizations demonstrate federal deference 
to religious liberty concerns and were 
promulgated to facilitate rather than inhibit 
the free exercise of religion. 
 
4. The Mandate and Accommodation 
Scheme Have a Rational Basis 
 
Rather than make an argument based on the 
rational relationship standard, Plaintiffs 
instead contend our decision in Hobby Lobby 
precludes us from finding that public health 
and gender equality, without greater 
specificity, constitute compelling 
governmental interests. But, as we have 
explained, the compelling interest test does 
not apply; the rational basis test does. The 
Government observes that in the cases before 
us, the accommodation scheme rationally 
serves the twin interests of facilitating 
religious exercise and filling coverage gaps 
resulting from accommodating that religious 
exercise. 
 
On rational basis review, these interests are 
sufficient. Alleviating governmental 
interference with religious exercise, which 
the accommodation scheme does, is a 
permissible legislative purpose. And we need 
not scrutinize whether the Government's 
interest in public health and gender equality 
is more compelling in this case than in Hobby 
Lobby. We need only determine that public 
health and gender equality are legitimate 
state interests. We believe they meet this 
more permissive standard, which is not 
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foreclosed by our compelling interest 
analysis in Hobby Lobby. The 
accommodation scheme advances both the 
free exercise of religion and the 
Government's legitimate interests in public 
health and gender equality.  
 
Furthermore, when applying the rational 
basis test, we are not limited to interests 
specifically articulated by the Departments. 
We may look to any conceivable legitimate 
governmental interest, and "the burden is 
upon the challenging party to negative any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis." The more 
specific governmental interest in health by 
ensuring access to contraception without cost 
sharing, which we did not specifically 
address in Hobby Lobby, would constitute a 
legitimate interest conceivably advanced by 
the accommodation scheme. The 
Departments' recognized interest in the 
uniformity and ease of administration of its 
programs would also meet this standard.  
 
The Mandate and accommodation scheme 
easily pass the rational basis test. Because the 
Mandate is both neutral and generally 
applicable and supported by a rational basis, 
Plaintiffs fail to make out a plausible claim 
under the Free Exercise Clause. 
 
B. Establishment Clause 
 
Plaintiffs contend that exempting churches 
and integrated auxiliaries from the Mandate 
but requiring religious non-profit 
organizations to seek an accommodation 
violates the Establishment Clause. We 
disagree. Because the Departments have 
chosen to distinguish between entities based 
on neutral, objective organizational criteria 
and not by denominational preference or 
religiosity, the distinction does not run afoul 
of the Establishment Clause. 
 
1. Organizational Distinctions Well-
Established in Federal Law 
 
Federal law distinguishes between different 
types of religious organizations, and as we 
discuss below, this differentiation is 
constitutionally permissible. Under the ACA 
and its implementing regulations, a religious 
employer "is organized and operates as a 
nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (a)(3)(A)(iii) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended." The regulations at issue in this 
case draw on the tax code's distinction 
between houses of worship and religious 
non-profits, a "longstanding and familiar" 
distinction in federal law.  
 
Exempting churches while requiring other 
religious objectors to seek an accommodation 
is standard practice under the tax code. The 
IRC and other regulations award benefits to 
some religious organizations—typically, 
houses of worship—based on articulable 
criteria that other religious organizations do 
not meet.  
 
Churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and 
conventions or associations of churches are 
automatically considered tax exempt and 
need not notify the government they are 
applying for recognition, but other religious 
non-profit organizations must apply for tax-
exempt status if their annual gross receipts 
are more than $5,000. Similarly, churches, 
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their integrated auxiliaries, conventions or 
associations of churches, and the exclusively 
religious activities of any religious order 
need not file tax returns, but religious non-
profit organizations with gross receipts above 
$5,000—even if they are tax-exempt—must 
file annually. Congress has placed special 
limitations on tax inquiries and examinations 
of churches, but not integrated auxiliaries, 
church-operated schools, or religious non-
profit organizations.  
 
Congress has used similar organizational 
distinctions in the realm of religious 
accommodations. Churches and qualified 
church-controlled organizations that object to 
paying Social Security and Medicare taxes 
for religious reasons may opt out of paying 
them by filing a form with the IRS, but other 
religious non-profit organizations may not.  
 
2. Organizational Distinctions and 
Respecting the Religion Clauses 
 
Distinctions based on organizational form 
enable the government to simultaneously 
respect both the Free Exercise Clause and 
Establishment Clause and permit the 
construction of accommodation schemes that 
pass constitutional muster. The Supreme 
Court has concluded: 
 
[t]he general principle deducible from 
the First Amendment and all that has 
been said by the Court is this: that we 
will not tolerate either 
governmentally established religion 
or governmental interference with 
religion. Short of those expressly 
proscribed governmental acts there is 
room for play in the joints productive 
of a benevolent neutrality which will 
permit religious exercise to exist 
without sponsorship and without 
interference. 
 
We recognize the Government enjoys some 
discretion in fashioning religious 
accommodations, and believe doing so on the 
basis of organizational form comports with 
the Establishment Clause. 
 
3. Organizational Distinctions Compatible 
with Larson and Colorado Christian 
 
The Departments have offered the 
accommodation to Plaintiffs based on their 
organizational form. Plaintiffs rely on the 
decisions in Larson v. Valente, and Colorado 
Christian University v. Weaver, to support 
their Establishment Clause claim. But those 
cases do not hold that distinctions based on 
organizational type are impermissible. 
 
Larson involved an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a Minnesota law that imposed 
registration and reporting requirements on 
religious organizations that received less than 
half of their contributions from members or 
affiliated organizations. The legislature drew 
this distinction to discriminate against 
particular religions, which was evident in the 
legislative history. Colorado Christian 
differentiated institutions based on intrusive 
inquiries into their degree of religiosity. In 
Colorado Christian, we concluded 
Colorado's exclusion of "pervasively 
sectarian" institutions from state scholarship 
programs violated the First Amendment "for 
two reasons: the program expressly 
discriminates among religions without 
constitutional justification, and its criteria for 
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doing so involve unconstitutionally intrusive 
scrutiny of religious belief and practice."  
 
Neither of these two concerns in Colorado 
Christian is applicable here. 
 
Larson and Colorado Christian prohibit 
preferences based on denomination (e.g., 
Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, etc.) and religiosity 
(e.g., pervasively sectarian, moderately 
sectarian, non-sectarian, etc.), but do not 
prohibit distinctions based on organizational 
type (e.g., church, non-profit, university, 
etc.). As Larson noted: "The clearest 
command of the Establishment Clause is that 
one religious denomination cannot be 
officially preferred over another." 
 
In Colorado Christian, we determined 
that "defendants supply no reason to think 
that the government may discriminate 
between 'types of institution' on the basis of 
the nature of the religious practice these 
institutions are moved to engage in." As a 
result, Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
clearly indicates denominational preferences 
expressed by the government are subject to 
strict scrutiny. Religiosity distinctions are 
subject to strict scrutiny as well because they 
involve the government in scrutinizing and 
making decisions based on particular 
expressions of religious belief.  
 
Plaintiffs cite no case holding that 
organizational distinctions, as opposed to 
those based on denomination or religiosity, 
run afoul of the Establishment Clause.  
 
Unlike Awad v. Ziriax, which concerned a 
state constitutional amendment forbidding 
courts from considering or using Sharia law, 
evidence of animus or favoritism aimed at a 
denomination or degree of religiosity is 
absent here. "Because the law's distinction 
does not favor a certain denomination and 
does not cause excessive entanglement 
between government and religion, the 
framework does not violate the 
Establishment Clause."  
 
Neither Larson nor Colorado Christian 
supports Plaintiffs' claim that distinctions 
between churches and other religious entities 
is impermissible. As we concluded in 
Colorado Christian, "if the State wishes to 
choose among otherwise eligible institutions, 
it must employ neutral, objective criteria 
rather than criteria that involve the evaluation 
of contested religious questions and 
practices." This is what the Departments have 
done with the accommodation scheme in 
compliance with the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause. 
 
4. Plaintiffs' Argument Based on the 
Departments' Rationale 
 
Plaintiffs seize on the Departments' rationale 
for the distinction that religious non-profit 
organizations are more likely than churches 
to employ individuals who do not share their 
employers' beliefs but are nevertheless 
entitled to contraceptive coverage under the 
ACA. Plaintiffs argue some denominations 
are less likely to carry out ministry functions 
through a church or integrated auxiliary than 
others, and that the workforces of some non-
profit institutions may be more religiously 
homogenous than the workforces of some 
established churches. 
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The Departments' rationale may not be 
perfectly accurate, but it does not make the 
accommodation scheme unconstitutional. 
The class of religious non-profit 
organizations encompasses a vast array of 
religiously affiliated universities, hospitals, 
service providers, and charities, some of 
them employing thousands of people. Of 
course, some religious non-profit 
organizations may be more likely than some 
churches to employ co-religionists, but the 
Departments may reasonably recognize that, 
on the whole, churches are more likely to 
employ those who share their beliefs. The 
Departments originally exempted religious 
employers to "respect[] the unique 
relationship between a house of worship and 
its employees in ministerial positions." We 
recognize that relationship between houses of 
worship and ministerial employees has been 
given special solicitude under the First 
Amendment. The Departments must avoid 
inquiries that involve them in "excessive 
entanglement" between religion and 
government, see Colorado Christian, and the 
general notion that houses of worship are 
more likely than religious non-profit 
organizations to employ people of the same 
faith avoids impermissible scrutiny into the 
beliefs of religious entities and their 
employees. 
  
* * * * 
 
Drawing a distinction between religious 
employers and religious non-profit 
organizations is a neutral and reasonable way 
for the Departments to pursue their legitimate 
goals in a constitutional manner. It gives 
special solicitude to churches to facilitate the 
liberties guaranteed by the Free Exercise 
Clause, and offers the accommodation 
scheme to relieve religious non-profit 
organizations of their obligation to provide 
contraceptive coverage under the Mandate 
without imposing a substantial burden on 
their religious exercise. The accommodation 
scheme does not violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
 
C. Free Speech Clause 
 
Plaintiffs finally contend the accommodation 
scheme violates the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment, which states that 
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech," U.S. Const. amend. 
1, by compelling them both to speak and 
remain silent, see Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the 
Blind of N.C., Inc., First, they argue that 
requiring them to sign and deliver the Form 
or the notification to HHS constitutes 
compelled speech. Second, they argue that 
prohibiting them from influencing their 
TPAs' provision of contraceptive coverage 
compels them to be silent. Both arguments 
fail. 
 
1. Compelled Speech 
 
The compelled speech claim fails. To the 
extent such a claim requires government 
interference with the plaintiff's own message, 
the regulations do not require an 
organization seeking an accommodation to 
engage in speech it finds objectionable or 
would not otherwise express. The only act the 
accommodation scheme requires is for 
religious non-profit organizations with group 
health plans to sign and deliver the Form or 
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notification expressing their religious 
objection to providing contraceptive 
coverage. The Sixth Circuit reasoned: "Even 
assuming the government is compelling this 
speech, it is not speech that the appellants 
disagree with and so cannot be the basis of a 
First Amendment claim." Plaintiffs cannot 
point to speech they are required to express 
and find objectionable. 
  
Indeed, Plaintiffs have not shown any 
likelihood that their sending in the Form or 
the notification would convey a message of 
support for contraception. Plaintiffs do not 
demonstrate their TPA, their health insurance 
issuer, or HHS—any one of which would be 
the sole recipient of the Form or 
notification—would view it as anything other 
than an objection to providing contraception. 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. 
Rights, Inc. ("FAIR") is instructive. In FAIR, 
a group of law schools challenged the 
Solomon Amendment, a federal statute that 
denied federal funding to universities that 
barred military recruiters from their 
campuses. At that time, the military did not 
permit gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals 
to serve. The schools claimed a First 
Amendment compelled speech violation, 
arguing their compliance with the Solomon 
Amendment would signal their agreement 
with this policy. The Supreme Court rejected 
the argument, noting compliance did not 
signal agreement with the military's 
positions, and the Solomon Amendment did 
not prevent the schools from making their 
own position clear.  
 
This point is even stronger in the instant case, 
where Plaintiffs would send the Form or 
notification to convey their opposition to 
providing contraception, and the ACA and 
implementing regulations do not prevent 
them from expressing that opposition widely. 
Plaintiffs remain free to express opposition to 
contraception; "[n]othing in the[] final 
regulations prohibits an eligible organization 
from expressing its opposition to the use of 
contraceptives." With the passage of the 
interim final rule, Plaintiffs also have the 
option to send a letter or email to HHS 
expressly objecting to any provision of 
contraception. They can fully explain their 
position in that notification. We are 
especially unconvinced that this option, freed 
from the text of the Form and permitting 
greater self-expression, forces Plaintiffs to 
engage in unwanted speech. Plaintiffs have 
not suggested the notification must be 
conveyed or communicated to any third 
parties or wider audience aside from the 
Departments themselves.  
Even if Plaintiffs could identify speech they 
disagreed with—for example, identifying the 
name of their TPA or health insurance 
issuer—the argument that they are forced to 
send a message they do not wish to send is 
unavailing. The First Amendment does not—
and cannot—protect organizations from 
having to make any and all statements "they 
wish to avoid." The cases cited by Plaintiffs 
are not about routine administrative burdens 
akin to complying with the accommodation 
scheme.  
 
"Compelling an organization to send a form 
to a third party to claim eligibility for an 
exemption 'is simply not the same as forcing 
a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a 
Jehovah's Witness to display the motto "Live 
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Free or Die," and it trivializes the freedom 
protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest 
that it is.'"  
 
"That would be the equivalent of entitling a 
tax protester to refuse on First Amendment 
grounds to fill out a 1099 form and mail it to 
the Internal Revenue Service." None of the 
cases cited by Plaintiffs involve compliance 
with the administrative requirements of a 
government program, and especially not a 
government program designed to exempt and 
distance an organization from activity it finds 
objectionable. 
 
We finally note that Plaintiffs' signature and 
delivery of the Form or notification to HHS 
is "plainly incidental to the . . . regulation of 
conduct" and thus is not protected speech. 
The act of signing and delivering the Form or 
notification to HHS is required to opt out of 
the Mandate. The Supreme Court has 
"rejected the view that 'conduct can be 
labeled "speech" whenever the person 
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to 
express an idea.' Instead, we have extended 
First Amendment protection only to conduct 
that is inherently expressive." The fact that 
Plaintiffs must complete the Form or 
notification to HHS to opt out of coverage 
does not render the act inherently expressive.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject 
Plaintiffs' compelled speech claim. 
 
2. Compelled Silence 
 
We further reject the claim that the 
accommodation scheme compels Plaintiffs' 
silence. Like the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, 
we note Plaintiffs have made only general 
claims objecting to the non-interference 
regulation and have failed to indicate how it 
precludes speech in which they wish to 
engage. After the issuance of the interim final 
rule repealing the non-interference 
regulation, we do not believe this question is 
before us. We agree with the Government and 
the D.C. Circuit that the repeal of the non-
interference rule renders Plaintiffs' claims 
regarding compelled silence moot.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
We have reviewed the district courts' 
decisions to grant or deny a preliminary 
injunction to Plaintiffs in the three cases 
before us. Because we determine the ACA 
and its implementing regulations do not 
substantially burden Plaintiffs' religious 
exercise or violate the Plaintiffs' First 
Amendment rights, Plaintiffs have not 
established a likelihood of success on the 
merits or a likely threat of irreparable harm as 
required for a preliminary injunction.  
 
We therefore affirm the district court's denial 
of a preliminary injunction in Little Sisters, 
and reverse the district courts' grant of a 
preliminary injunction in Southern Nazarene, 
and Reaching Souls. 
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“A Religion Case Too Far for the Supreme Court?” 
The New York Times 
Linda Greenhouse 
July 23, 2015 
 
The court of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. 
has been one of the most religion-friendly 
Supreme Courts in modern history. Nearly 
every religious claim presented to the court 
has emerged a winner, from explicitly 
sectarian prayer at town board meetings, in 
last year’s closely divided Town of Greece 
decision, to beards for Muslim inmates in a 
prison system that banned facial hair — a 
unanimous decision that defied the court’s 
tradition of deference to prison officials and 
their rules. 
 
Most famous, of course, was last year’s 
Hobby Lobby decision, exempting a for-
profit company from having to cover 
contraception in its employee health plan, as 
otherwise required under the Affordable Care 
Act, because of the owners’ religious 
scruples about birth control. 
 
Now the post-Hobby Lobby cases have, 
inevitably, arrived at the Supreme Court’s 
door. Three appeals have been filed so far, 
and the justices will decide shortly after the 
new term begins in October whether to accept 
any of them. At that point, the spotlight will 
return to the court, along with the heated 
rhetoric about the Obama administration’s 
supposed “war on religion.” Not only is there 
no such “war,” but the administration has 
bent over backward to accommodate 
religious claims that are by any measure 
extreme. The problem is that the religious 
groups pressing these claims refuse to take 
yes for an answer. The question is whether 
their arguments go too far, even for the 
Roberts court. 
 
At issue are the options the Obama 
administration has made available to a 
category of employers deemed “religious 
nonprofit organizations” that object to 
including birth control in their employee 
health plans. These groups differ from 
“religious employers,” a category essentially 
limited to churches, which are deemed 
exempt under the Affordable Care Act 
regulations. Rather, these are religiously 
affiliated nonprofits such as colleges, 
seminaries and religious orders like the Little 
Sisters of the Poor, which runs nursing homes 
and describes itself as an equal-opportunity 
employer in its hiring practices for lay staff 
members. These nonprofits do have to 
provide contraception coverage unless they 
accept the administration’s offer to opt out of 
the requirement by passing the legal 
obligation on to their insurance carriers. 
 
Under pre-existing regulations that the 
Obama administration fine-tuned in the 
aftermath of the Hobby Lobby decision, all 
these organizations have to do to qualify for 
the exemption is to ask for it, by filling out a 
two-page form, or even more simply by 
sending a letter to the Department of Health 
and Human Services declaring that they have 
a religious objection to paying for birth 
control. At that point, their obligation ceases 
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and the coverage has to be provided by the 
organizations’ insurance carrier or, in the 
case of a self-insured plan, by the third-party 
administrator, without any financial 
involvement by the organization. 
 
Dozens of these organizations promptly filed 
suit claiming that they couldn’t possibly fill 
out the form or sign the letter because to do 
so would make them complicit in the ultimate 
choice their employees might make to use 
birth control. 
 
It’s important to understand the difference 
between these cases and the lawsuit by 
Hobby Lobby’s owners. As a for-profit 
company, Hobby Lobby had no 
accommodation available. It had either to 
provide the coverage or pay a huge fine. In 
fact, the court’s majority opinion, written by 
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., strongly 
suggested that the problem, as the majority 
saw it, could be solved if only the 
administration would offer Hobby Lobby the 
same choice it was giving the religious 
nonprofits. Justice Alito wrote that the 
Department of Health and Human Services 
“itself has demonstrated that it has at its 
disposal an approach that is less restrictive 
than requiring employers to fund 
contraceptive methods that violate their 
religious beliefs.” In a footnote, he added: 
“The less restrictive approach we describe 
accommodates the religious beliefs asserted 
in these cases.” Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 
who provided the fifth vote to the majority, 
wrote in a concurring opinion that the 
accommodation as described “does not 
impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.” 
The Hobby Lobby case had not been argued 
on this basis, and Justice Alito noted that the 
court was not deciding whether such an 
accommodation would suffice “for purposes 
of all religious claims.” To that extent, the 
statements were nonbinding “dicta,” not part 
of the holding. But they have had a powerful 
influence in the lower courts. Cases 
challenging the adequacy of the 
accommodation as applied to religious 
nonprofits have now made their way through 
six of the 12 federal appellate circuits. 
Remarkably, every court has rejected the 
religious claims. 
 
Not all the decisions have been unanimous; 
there have been dissenting opinions by 
individual judges, a fact that may lead the 
Supreme Court to accept one or more of the 
pending appeals despite the absence of the 
“conflict in the circuits” that the court usually 
waits for. But, notably, judges across the 
ideological spectrum have ruled for the 
government. One of the country’s most 
conservative federal judges, Jerry E. Smith, 
wrote the opinion last month for a unanimous 
panel of one of the country’s most 
conservative courts, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
 
The Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision 
“is of no help to the plaintiffs’ position,” 
Judge Smith wrote in East Texas Baptist 
University v. Burwell. The reason, he 
explained, was “not just that there are more 
links in the causal chain here than in Hobby 
Lobby.” Rather, it was that “what the 
regulations require of the plaintiffs here has 
nothing to do with providing contraceptives.” 
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It’s worth quoting Judge Smith at some 
length, including his reference to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the 
federal law under which the Hobby Lobby 
case and the current cases were brought: 
 
“The plaintiffs urge that the accommodation 
uses their plans as vehicles for payments for 
contraceptives. But that is just what the 
regulations prohibit. Once the plaintiffs apply 
for the accommodation, the insurers may not 
include contraceptive coverage in the plans. 
The insurers and third-party administrators 
may not impose any direct or indirect costs 
for contraceptives on the plaintiffs; they may 
not send materials about contraceptives 
together with plan materials; in fact, they 
must send plan participants a notice 
explaining that the plaintiffs do not 
administer or fund contraceptives. The 
payments for contraceptives are completely 
independent of the plans. . . The acts that 
violate their faith are the acts of the 
government, insurers, and third-party 
administrators, but R.F.R.A. does not entitle 
them to block third parties from engaging in 
conduct with which they disagree.” 
 
And of course, the choices and the rights of 
third parties, in this instance, the female 
employees, are the whole point. It is not only 
that female employees, and not their bosses, 
make the choice to use birth control. It is that 
the employers’ religious objections, if 
honored, would cause these third parties 
actual harm — harm that would be avoided if 
the employers simply signed the form or sent 
the letter. The extreme to which the plaintiffs’ 
refusal takes their “complicity” argument is 
what the appeals courts have found so 
alarming. The organizations don’t want to 
pay for birth control and they don’t want 
anyone else to pay for it either. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
10th Circuit had this to say in a decision last 
week, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell: 
“Plaintiffs sincerely oppose contraception, 
but their religious objection cannot hamstring 
government efforts to ensure that plan 
participants and beneficiaries receive the 
coverage to which they are entitled.” 
 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the 
court said, “does not prevent the government 
from reassigning obligations after an objector 
opts out simply because the objector strongly 
opposes the ultimate goal of the generally 
applicable law. Plaintiffs’ complicity 
argument therefore fails. Opting out would 
eliminate their complicity with the mandate 
and require only routine and minimal 
administrative paperwork, and they are not 
substantially burdened by the government’s 
subsequent efforts to deliver contraceptive 
coverage in their stead.” 
 
Writing in The National Catholic Reporter 
last week, Michael Sean Winters, author of a 
blog on the publication’s website called 
Distinctly Catholic, praised the 10th Circuit 
decision, saying: “If you think the form used 
to object to participation is itself a form of 
participation, I am not sure how we, as a 
nation, can ever carve out religious 
exemptions.” 
 
Evidently, the religious groups pressing this 
litigation would rather keep fighting than 
declare victory. Mark Rienzi, senior counsel 
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of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 
which represents the Little Sisters of the Poor 
and is involved in many of the other cases, 
responded to the 10th Circuit’s decision by 
accusing the Obama administration of an 
“unrelenting pursuit of the Little Sisters of 
the Poor” and of seeking to “crush the Little 
Sisters’ faith.” 
 
Hyperbole in defense of a legal position is no 
crime, certainly. But the vigor with which the 
complicity claim is being pressed does raise 
the question: What’s going on? In an 
illuminating article last month in The 
American Prospect titled “Conscience and 
the Culture Wars,” two constitutional 
scholars, Reva B. Siegel of Yale and Douglas 
NeJaime of U.C.L.A., observe that “the new 
conservative campaign for religious 
exemptions follows a well-established 
pattern” in which advocates whose core 
positions have lost legitimacy in the public 
mind “look for new ways to frame their 
views, often borrowing from their 
opponents.” 
 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was 
passed in 1993 by overwhelming bipartisan 
majorities in Congress and signed into law by 
President Bill Clinton; it was not proposed or 
seen as an agent of the culture wars. But it has 
become one, Professors Siegel and NeJaime 
argue: “After failing to prohibit abortion and 
same-sex marriage, conservatives have 
sought to create religious exemptions from 
laws that protect the right to abortion or 
same-sex marriage.” They explain: “If unable 
to protect traditional sexual morality through 
laws of general application, conservatives 
can protect traditional values through liberal 
frames — by asserting claims to religious 
exemption and by appealing to secular 
commitments to pluralism and 
nondiscrimination.” Reva Siegel has 
elsewhere described this strategy as 
“preservation through transformation.” 
 
Will the Roberts court buy it? Or, I suppose, 
the question might be framed more precisely: 
Will Justice Kennedy? I don’t see it. The 
implications are too enormous. As the 10th 
Circuit observed, “Courts have recognized 
that, to opt out of military service for 
religious reasons, a conscientious objector 
must notify the government of his objection 
knowing that someone else will take his 
place.” Complicity? People have to pay their 
taxes, whether they have objections, religious 
or otherwise, to the wars they thereby help to 
finance. Complicity? 
 
Of course, the court might avoid ensnaring 
itself in this web by allowing the circuit court 
decisions to continue to unfold in uniform 
fashion, as the justices briefly did with same-
sex marriage last fall, before a 
nonconforming decision from the Sixth 
Circuit forced their hand. I hope the court 
doesn’t wait. This year marks the 50th 
anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut, the 
case that identified a constitutional right to 
birth control. At issue now is not only the 
right of women who happen to work for a 
religious employer to receive, on par with 
other women, a benefit the government 
deems an essential part of health care. At 
stake is the health of civil society in an 
increasingly diverse country. Religious 
conflict is a worldwide problem that of 
course lies far outside the Supreme Court’s 
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purview. But the court can do its part, as I 
believe it will, by labeling this anachronistic 
and politically driven dispute over birth 
control for what it is, a case too far.  
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“With Health Care Lawsuit, the Little Sisters of the Poor Step into 
the Spotlight” 
The Washington Post 
Saba Hamedy 
January 20, 2014 
People recognized Saint Jeanne Jugan by the 
begging basket she carried while walking 
down the roads of Brittany, in northwest 
France, in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. 
Going from door to door, Jugan would ask 
people for money, gifts — whatever they 
could spare for the elderly poor. 
Nearly 175 years later, nuns from the 
religious order Jugan founded, the Little 
Sisters of the Poor, can still be seen in public, 
collecting donations to support their work. 
Unlike some nuns who wear casual clothing 
these days, the Little Sisters dress in 
traditional habits, all-white or black with gray 
veils. 
Except for their soliciting of donations, the 
members of the “begging order,” as it’s 
sometimes known, have largely stayed out of 
the spotlight. But that changed in September 
when the order became one of the plaintiffs 
in a lawsuit filed against the Affordable Care 
Act’s contraceptive mandate, placing it at the 
center of a debate over health care and 
religious freedom. 
The nonprofit gained even more public 
attention when Supreme Court Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor granted a last-minute temporary 
injunction Dec. 31, giving the sisters a 
reprieve from the requirement. 
The sisters, who are among 45 religious 
groups fighting the legislation, take issue 
with an element of the law that requires all 
employers, regardless of religious affiliation, 
to provide insurance coverage for 
contraception to their workers. For the 
sisters, that would include employees at 29 
homes they operate for the elderly in cities 
across the United States, including 
Baltimore, Chicago and Los Angeles. 
The order’s “entire reason for being is to 
serve the poor and elderly,” said Robert 
Destro, a law professor at Catholic 
University. 
So why join a widely watched legal battle? 
“They didn’t think they had any other 
choice,” said Daniel Blomberg, senior 
counsel at the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty, a nonprofit public-interest law firm 
dedicated to protecting the free expression of 
religious traditions. The Little Sisters 
approached the Becket Fund about possible 
legal action, and the firm filed suit on behalf 
of the order’s home in Denver, which has 60 
employees who are not nuns. 
Blomberg said the sisters had two options: 
provide contraception coverage to their 
employees, in violation of their Roman 
Catholic beliefs, or pay hefty tax fines for 
failing to comply with the law. 
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The Obama administration offered church-
related organizations, including the Little 
Sisters, an accommodation, allowing them to 
opt out of the mandate if they signed a self-
certification form. 
The compromise would mean that the sisters 
would not have to provide contraceptive 
coverage themselves, but in many cases their 
workers would be able to get birth control 
from their insurance carriers. 
Some Catholic groups accepted that 
compromise, but many, like the Little Sisters, 
did not. 
“The mandate violates our religious 
freedoms,” said Mother Loraine Marie Clare 
Maguire, provincial superior of the 
congregation’s Baltimore province. 
The Little Sisters, who came to the United 
States in 1868, have 10 to 13 sisters in each 
home. They serve more than 13,000 elderly 
poor people in 31 countries around the world, 
said Sister Constance Carolyn Veit, the 
order’s spokeswoman. 
The Little Sisters do not belong to the 
Leadership Conference of Women Religious, 
the umbrella group for most American nuns, 
which was censured by the Vatican for 
promoting what it called “radical feminist 
themes.” Instead, the Little Sisters belong to 
the Council of Major Superiors of Women 
Religious, and with 300 members in the 
United States they are considered one of the 
larger religious communities in the 
organization. 
In addition to vows of chastity, poverty and 
obedience, the Little Sisters take a vow of 
hospitality. Admission to their homes is open 
to low-income people who are at least 60 
years old, regardless of religion. Homes vary 
in size and offer several levels of care, 
including nursing homes and residential or 
assisted living. 
As their founder, Jugan, ordered, the Little 
Sisters do not have an endowment.  
The strong family spirit the sisters share with 
the elderly poor and their tradition of begging 
distinguishes them as an order, Veit said. The 
nuns put faith in Saint Joseph, their patron 
saint, and their motto: “If God is with us, it 
will be accomplished.” 
“A lot of people look at poor elderly as if they 
don’t matter,” Blomberg said. “The sisters 
push back against that and make it very clear 
that these lives do matter. They are 
committed to honoring life at its very end.” 
Pope Benedict XVI addressed the importance 
of their mission while visiting the Little 
Sisters in London in September 2010. 
“I come to you as a brother who knows well 
the joys and struggles that come with age,” he 
said, according to the order’s Web site. “As 
advances in medicine and other factors lead 
to increased longevity, it is important to 
recognize the presence of growing numbers 
of older people as a blessing for society.” 
Jugan, who was canonized by Benedict in 
2009, often said, “Making the elderly happy 
— that is everything.” 
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Maguire says she hopes the sisters can 
continue channeling their founder for at least 
another 175 years. 
“We take care of the elderly poor,” she said. 
“That’s really our main concern and 
objective: to live that mission.” 
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“Why Little Sisters of the Poor is Right to Be Concerned about 
Religious Freedom” 
The Daily Signal 
Elizabeth Slatterly 
July 31, 2015 
The Obama administration continues its 
persistent attack on the Little Sisters of the 
Poor following their challenge to the 
Obamacare abortion drug mandate. 
Earlier this summer, the 10th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled against the Little 
Sisters in their challenge to the Affordable 
Care Act requirement that they provide 
employees with health care coverage that 
includes contraceptives, sterilization, and 
abortion-inducing drugs and devices, or fill 
out a form notifying the Department of 
Health and Human Services of their religious 
objection to providing such coverage. 
The Obama administration considers this 
second option as accommodating the Little 
Sisters’ religious beliefs because the 
notification initiates the process of insurers 
and third-party administrators providing the 
mandated coverage at no cost to the insured. 
The Little Sisters, however, maintain that this 
so-called accommodation does no such thing. 
Filling out the form does not insulate them 
from complicity in the facilitation of 
potentially life-ending drugs and devices, and 
that substantially burdens their free exercise 
of religion. 
Noel Francisco and Paul Pohl, counsel for 
other nonprofit religious employers that are 
challenging the accommodation, aptly noted 
that this “does not accommodate the 
plaintiffs’ religious beliefs at all” because it 
“still forces [the religious employers] to hire 
and maintain a contract with an insurance 
company that will provide the objectionable 
… Maintaining this relationship is exactly 
what the plaintiffs find religiously 
objectionable.” 
As Francisco and Pohl analogize: 
Imagine that you hire a piano tutor for 
your children and learn that the tutor 
is supplying them with free cigarettes. 
You might object to maintaining the 
arrangement, regardless of whether 
you are paying for the cigarettes. Or 
imagine you have a religious 
objection to alcohol and learn that the 
caterer you have hired for your 
wedding is going to serve free booze 
to all of your wedding guests. You 
might want to fire the caterer. 
It’s worth mentioning two other alternatives 
available to the Little Sisters: drop their 
health insurance or pay crushing fines of up 
to $100 per employee per day. 
The 10th Circuit panel agreed with the 
Obama administration, finding that the 
accommodation “relieves [the Little Sisters] 
of their statutory obligation” to provide the 
objectionable coverage. 
The panel wrote that the Little Sisters are 
wrong about the legal effect of filling out this 
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form because “[f]ederal law, not the form or 
notification of HHS, provides contraceptive 
coverage.” 
Thus, in the panel’s view, the Little Sisters’ 
argument that its act triggers coverage “fails 
to establish any burden” on their religious 
exercise, and even if it did establish a burden, 
the panel reasoned, “de minimis 
administrative tasks do not substantially 
burden religious exercise.” 
Linda Greenhouse opined in the New York 
Times that the Little Sisters’ claims are 
“anachronistic and politically driven” and “a 
case too far.” 
Greenhouse asserts that the “administration 
has bent over backward to accommodate 
religious claims.” But this misses the heart of 
the Little Sisters’ objection. 
Though the government may believe its 
accommodation is sufficient to distance 
religious employers from acts they find 
morally objectionable, the Little Sisters (and 
many others) clearly do not agree. 
As the Little Sisters explained in a brief filed 
with the 10th Circuit, the accommodation 
“merely offers [them] another way to violate 
their religion.” 
The 10th Circuit panel declared that the Little 
Sister’s “religious objection cannot 
hamstring government efforts to ensure that 
plan participants and beneficiaries receive the 
coverage to which they are entitled.” 
But employees may obtain contraception in 
numerous ways without forcing the 
involvement of the Little Sisters’ healthcare 
plan. 
As Justice Samuel Alito noted in the majority 
opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the 
government could provide or pay for these 
drugs and devices itself, while allowing the 
Little Sisters and other non-profits to obey 
their conscience. 
The Little Sisters last week filed a cert. 
petition asking the Supreme Court to review 
their case, one of six accommodation cases 
pending before the Court. 
Let’s hope the justices agree to hear one of 
these cases next term—and that one branch 
of government takes the right of conscience 
seriously. 
 
